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The  promotion  of  the  rule  of  law  has  become  an  important  dimension  of  the 
European Union’s relations towards its neighbourhood. The rule of law is, however, a 
complex  and  multifaceted  notion  and  the  EU’s  rule  of  law  promotion  policy  has 
often been criticised for being either inefficient or self-interested. This collection of 
short papers offers an analysis of various case studies using the analytical framework 
of  structural  foreign  policy  (SFP)  developed  by  Stephan  Keukeleire.  It  aims  to 
promote  an  original  analytical  perspective  on  the  EU’s  foreign  policy  but  also  to 
critically test and further develop the SFP analytical framework. The contributions of 
this collection consist of the shortened version of students’ Master’s theses written at 
the College of Europe during the academic year 2011-2012 in the framework of the 
course “The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor” taught by Stephan Keukeleire, Chairholder 
of  the  TOTAL  Chair  of  EU F oreign  Policy  in  the  Department  of  EU  International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies.  
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1.  Introduction: What Is Structural Foreign Policy? 
Raphaël Metais & Charles Thépaut 
 
The notion of rule of law lies at the heart of European integration and constitutes one 
of the core principles of the European Union (EU).1 Considered a key dimension to 
the EU’s success in bringing about peace, stability and prosperity to the continent, 
the  rule  of  law  has  also  permeated  the  EU’s  external  relations  and  is  today  an 
essential dimension of its foreign policy.2 The importance of promoting the rule of law 
internationally in order to strengthen international order and the EU’s citizen’s security 
was emphasised by the 2003 European Security Strategy.3 Furthermore, the various 
bilateral political and legal instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) with the Western Balkan countries 
recurrently refer to this notion.4 Rule of law has also been at the core of various EU 
missions carried out under the Common Security and Defence Policy (such as EUJUST 
Themis in Georgia, EULEX in Kosovo, and EUPOL COPPS in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories).5  
Rule of law, however, cannot easily be defined and has traditionally been presented 
as an “essentially contested concept”.6 Nevertheless, the view that the rule of law 
entails a formal/procedural and a substantive dimension seems to prevail.7 Besides 
this first complexity, the EU’s rule of law promotion policy has been criticised under 
two further accounts. On the one hand, the discrepancy between the EU’s declared 
objectives and its concrete actions on the ground has been regularly underlined. On 
the other hand, critics have often pointed out that the EU’s rule of law promotion 
                                                           
1 Article 2 TEU lists the founding values of the EU.  
2 Article 21 TFEU on the general provisions of the EU’s external action.  
3 European Council, A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 
December 2003, p. 10.  
4 Concrete examples are given in the following contributions.  
5 G. De Baere, “European Integration and the Rule of Law in Foreign Policy”, in J. Dickson & P. 
Elefteriadis (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law Oxford, Oxford University 
Press,  2012;  M.  Ekengren  and  G.  Simons  (eds.), The  Politics  of  Security  Sector  Reform, 
Aldershot,  Ashgate,  2011;  D.  Spence  and  P.  Fluri  (eds.),  The  European  Union  and  Security 
Sector Reform, London, John Harper, 2008. 
6  R.  Fallon,  “‘The  Rule  of  Law’  as  a  Concept  in  Constitutional  Discourse”,  Columbia  Law 
Review, vol. 97, no. 1, 2007, p. 6.  
7  P.  Craig,  “Formal  and  Substantive  Conceptions  of  the  Rule  of  Law:  An  Analytical 
Framework”,  Public  Law,  vol.  20,  no.  4,  1997,  pp.  467-487;  N.  Wichmann,  Rule  of  Law 
Promotion in the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy:  Normative  or  Strategic  Power  Europe?, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2010, p. 53.  Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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can be equated to the promotion of its own interest at the expense of its partners’ 
particularities.8 This paper intends to contribute to this debate by providing different 
case studies of the EU’s rule of law promotion from countries covered by the ENP and 
the SAP.   
As often in the case of ENP analysis, the scope of this paper is broad and covers 
various  countries,  from  Lebanon  to  Armenia.  Methodological  conditions  were 
therefore required to make sure the different contributions could allow a minimum 
degree  of  generalisation  of  the  findings.  In  this  context,  the  paper’s  analytical 
foundations will be based on one specific framework that has the ambition to cover 
the  analysis  of  various  policy  grounds.  This  framework  is  the  one  developed  by 
Stephan Keukeleire in different publications,9 focusing on the idea of structures to 
assess the impact of EU actions in different areas. For Keukeleire, structures refer to 
relatively permanent organising principles (such as ‘capitalism’ or ‘democracy’) that 
condition the various sectors of human activities at various levels and to the opera-
tionalisation of these principles through a complex constellation of institutions, laws, 
habits, etc. Structural power refers to the power of an actor to influence or shape 
these principles in a sustainable way. Keukeleire defines structural foreign policy (SFP) 
as  “a  foreign  policy  which,  conducted  over  the  long-term,  seeks  to  influence  or 
shape  sustainable  political,  legal,  economic,  social,  security  and  other  structures 
which can be situated at various relevant levels (individual, society, state, regional, 
global…) in a given space” (see the matrix in Figure 1 below).10  
The immaterial or ideational factors are important for the sustainability of structures, 
as they influence the degree or depth of internalisation of these structures. These 
immaterial factors are related to history, the evolving belief systems in and identity of 
a country or society and to the legitimacy of both the structures that are promoted 
and the actor that aims to have a structural impact (the role of mental structures is 
here  of  primary  importance,  as  will  be  shown  in  the  following  contributions).  The 
degree of internalisation can vary from structures not internalised at all (for instance, 
                                                           
8 See, for instance, on the Western Balkans I. Ioannides & G. Collantes Celador, “The Internal-
External Security Nexus and EU Police/Rule of Law Missions in the Western Balkans”, Conflict, 
Security & Development, vol. 11, no. 4, 2011, pp. 415-445.  
9 S. Keukeleire, “The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and Structural 
diplomacy”,  in  W.  Rees  &  M.  Smith  (eds.),  International  Relations  of  the  European  Union, 
London,  SAGE  Publications,  2008;  S.  Keukeleire,  A.  Justaert  &  R.  Thiers,  “Reappraising 
Diplomacy: Structural Diplomacy and the Case of the European Union”, The Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp.143-165; S. Keukeleire & J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign 
Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2008. 
10 S. Keukeleire, “Structural Foreign Policy”, 2013 (forthcoming). Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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adopted in a purely declaratory way) to structures that are being deeply ingrained 
in the belief system, the  culture and the  identity of the population as well as the 
concerned elites.11 Internalisation, legitimacy and identity will be recurrent themes 
throughout this paper.  
Figure 1: Structural Foreign Policy: Sectors, Levels and Internalisation 
 
Source: Keukeleire, “Structural Foreign Policy”, op.cit, p. 11. 
This framework appears to be particularly relevant to solve some of the issues related 
to  the  analysis  of  rule  of  law  policies  because  it  focuses  the  attention  of  various 
dimensions that are often neglected by conventional foreign policy analysis. While 
acknowledging  the  effect  of  ‘hard  power’  and  other  means  of  more  traditional 
foreign policies, the SFP framework assumes that other elements are crucial.  
The  SFP  framework  therefore  positively  contributes  to  foreign  policy  analysis  in 
general, but it also provides useful tools and raises crucial questions when it comes 
specifically to EU external action. In its philosophy, in its processes and in the goals it 
sets  for  itself  in  the  neighbourhood,  the  EU  has  a  structural  ambition.  Through 
influence, for  example, transfer of the  acquis communautaire and direct bilateral 
cooperation, the EU wishes to orientate and shape the governance and the policy 
choices of its partners. In this regard, applying the SFP framework to the EU rule of law 
promotion is not only a way to challenge conventional wisdom of foreign policy or to 
                                                           
11 Keukeleire, “Structural Foreign Policy”, op.cit., p. 11. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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develop new tools of foreign policy analysis, but it is also a way to raise critical issues 
about the rationale and the method of EU foreign policy.  
An important feature of the analytical framework is that SFP can be assessed at the 
different stages of the foreign policy-making, which also correspond to the stages of 
the  policy-evaluation  cycle.12  First  come  the  policy  objectives  (declaration  and 
intentions). The second stage corresponds to their translation into a policy  output 
(instruments  and  budgets),  whereas  the  third  stage  deals  with  the  actual  policy 
implementation. The last stage consists of the policy outcome (results). 
The  analytical  framework  also  suggests  that  SFP  analysis  is  best  conducted  when 
resorting to an outside-in approach whereby the particularities of the target country 
(or  region)  are  taken  into  account.  If  an  international  actor  such  as  the  EU  is  to 
design an effective SFP, the context of the target country (which is often different 
from  that  of  the  EU),  its  material  (socio-economical)  and  immaterial  (related  to 
history,  beliefs  and  identity)  factors  should  be  taken  into  account.  This  outside-in 
approach  (based  on  thorough  and  interdisciplinary  knowledge  of  the  target 
country) helps judging what levels and sectors are relevant for the policy’s long-term 
success.13  Conversely,  adopting  an  outside-in  perspective  helps  explaining  the 
successes  or  failures  of  foreign  policy  by  pointing  out  the  neglected  or  omitted 
dimensions.  
The  following  essays  consist  of  the  summarised  versions  of  five  students’  Master’s 
theses written in the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies programme at 
the College of Europe in Bruges during the academic year 2011-12. These Master’s 
theses were supervised by the Chairholder of the TOTAL Chair of EU Foreign Policy. 
Due to the space constraints of this publication, only the essence of their research is 
presented here. The first four contributions are case studies from the EU’s neighbour-
hood. Essay 1 questions the EU’s policies towards Bosnia and Herzegovina in the field 
of the fight against corruption. In essay 2, the SFP framework is applied to analyse the 
EU’s commitment to promote the rule of law in Ukraine. Essay 3 is dedicated to the 
analysis of gender in EU-Armenian relations, whereas essay 4 focusses on the EU’s 
micro-rule-of-law policies in Lebanon. Essay 5 offers a personal reflection on the use 
of the SFP analytical framework, underlining the strengths but also the ambiguities of 
the analytical framework.  
                                                           
12 Ibid., p. 17.  
13 Ibid., pp. 14-15.  Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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Three main findings can already be put forward. First, the SFP analytical framework 
needs to be adapted and complemented for the needs of the analysis at hand. It 
can hardly be considered a ready-to-use tool and requires, prior to being purpose-
fully applied, a thorough theoretical reflection. The second finding derives from the 
first  one.  As  the  following  contributions  will  show,  the  need  to  adapt  the  SFP 
analytical toolbox might lead to analyses developed in diverging directions while 
being  based  on  the  same  conceptual  basis.  In  other  words,  the  SFP  framework 
applied to different case studies might look very different. And thirdly, the relevant 
use  of  the  SFP  analytical  framework  hinges  upon  an  excellent  knowledge  of  the 
target country and/or policy field. A refined analysis of the relevant structures in the 
field of the rule of law at various levels in a given country indeed requires specific 
skills (e.g. language) and knowledge (e.g. the ability to use data and methods from 
various academic fields).  
This  paper  therefore  represents  an  effort  to  promote  an  original  analytical 
perspective of the EU’s foreign policy but also attempts to critically test and further 
develop the SFP analytical framework.  
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2.   Corrupted Structural Foreign Policy: The EU’s Support for Anti-Corruption 
Efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Adnan Ćerimagić 
 
Introduction: Conceptual Basis 
The European Union (EU) has put the promotion of the rule of law and support for 
anti-corruption  efforts  high  on  the  list  of  external  action  goals.1  In  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina (BiH), the EU has been very active in supporting rebuilding efforts since 
the mid-1990s. The EU has developed and deployed a wide range of instruments 
(political,  military,  security  and  financial  instruments)  with  the  aim  to  support 
rebuilding of political, legal, economic and social life in BiH. In 2000, rebuilding efforts 
were transformed in support of reforms and approximation to EU norms, values and 
standards, after the EU acknowledged BiH as a potential candidate country for EU 
membership.2 Almost two decades after the EU started to support BiH, this country is 
still  torn  by  corruption,  “fraud,  embezzlement  and  the  sheer  abuse  of  power”.3 
Corruption is present in all spheres of public life, and it “threatens the consolidation of 
a viable, strong, multi-ethnic state and breeds politicians and institutions unable or 
unwilling to implement reforms that are crucial for the country’s integration into the 
European Union and NATO’s Partnership for Peace”.4 
In this essay I will assess why EU foreign policy failed to yield results in support for anti-
corruption in BiH. I will use the concept of structural foreign policy as it provides the 
framework for a comprehensive study. This holistic concept provides not only a basis 
for  researching  the  policy  development  phase,  but  also  the  policy  results.5  This 
conceptual framework enables an analysis in four stages that make up the policy-
making  cycle:  policy  development  (policy  objectives  and  policy  outputs  stages), 
policy  implementation  (policy  implementation  stage)  and  policy  results  (policy 
                                                           
1 See Article 177(2) of the Amsterdam Treaty on development cooperation; Article 181a of 
the  Nice  Treaty  and  Article  21  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty;  and  European  Communities, 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  on  a 
Union Policy Against Corruption, COM(97) 192 final, Brussels, 21 May 1997, Article 1. 
2 European Council, Santa Maria de Feira Council Conclusions, Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 
June 2000, chapter D, paragraph 67. 
3 P.C. van Duyne, “Corruption: Acts and Attitudes, in Combating Corruption in the European 
Union”, Series of Publications by the Academy of European Law in Trier, vol. 31, Köln, 2001, p. 
13. 
4 V. Devine & H. Mathisen, Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina – 2005, CMI Report, Bergen, 
2005, p. 7. 
5 S. Keukeleire, “Structural Foreign Policy”, 2013, (forthcoming), p. 3. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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outcomes  stage).6  Dividing  the analysis into  these  four  stages is useful because it 
provides  interdependent  approaches  to  the  research,  whereby  each  stage  can 
provide similar or different results. This concept is also useful as it emphasises the need 
for  an  outside-in  approach  that  has  been  lacking  in  the  literature  on  EU  foreign 
policy in general.7 Assessing the literature originating from an area that the foreign 
policy actor is aiming to influence, or by a researcher coming from that area, can 
provide  useful  insights  on  possible  factors  present  that  had  a  positive  and/or 
negative  influence  on  the  foreign  policy  results.  For  this  study  the  outside-in 
approach is also useful because it provides important data on the root cause of 
corruption.  
This essay provides asks the following question: to what extent can the EU’s rule of 
law promotion policy in BiH, through the support of anti-corruption efforts, be seen as 
structural foreign policy? Although the EU has set the promotion of the rule of law 
and  support  for  the  anti-corruption  efforts  in  BiH  high  on  its  agenda,  it  has  not 
managed to identify the root cause of corruption, nor to develop and implement a 
policy  that  would  tackle  the  negative  impact  that  corruption  has  on  the  overall 
progress in BiH and provide satisfactory results.  
The essay is organised in five parts. I start with (1) an analysis of corruption in BiH. The 
analysis will focus on the root cause and the level of corruption in the country. The 
analysis  will  then  address  the  four  above-mentioned  stages  of  the  policy-making 
cycle suggested by Keukeleire:  (2) policy objectives, (3) policy outputs, (4) policy 
implementation  and  (5)  policy  outcomes.8  Special  consideration  is  given  to  the 
following two characteristics of structural foreign policy: first, structural foreign policy 
has to be comprehensive, thereby aiming at creating new and/or shaping and/or 
influencing already existent structures within relevant sectors (e.g. the political, legal, 
socio-economic and security sectors) and at relevant  levels  (e.g.  individual, inter-
societal, societal, inter-state, state, regional, international and global) at the same 
time and for a longer period.9 The second characteristic is that the impact of this 
type of foreign policy has to deliver sustainable internalisation even after the pressure 
caused by the actor implementing the policy has passed (regardless of whether the 
                                                           
6 Keukeleire, op.cit., p. 17. 
7 R. Youngs, The EU’s Role in World Politics: A Retreat from Liberal Internationalism, New York, 
Routledge, 2010, p. 2. 
8 Keukeleire, op.cit., p. 17. 
9 Ibid., p. 11. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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policy  goal  was  creating,  shaping  or  influencing  structures).10 In  order  to  achieve 
sustainable internalisation in a majority of cases, the foreign policy also needs to aim 
at influencing mental structures. 
The  structural  foreign  policy  conceptual  framework,  however,  needs  to  be 
complemented for our case study. Theoretical underpinnings regarding the different 
ways in which a foreign policy actor can influence, shape or create structures in a 
foreign environment are indeed absent from this academic literature and need to 
be  borrowed  from  other  sources.  The  EU  enlargement  literature  describes  the 
adoption of EU rules, norms and values by third countries engaged in the accession 
process  to  the  EU  as  a p art  of  the  ‘EU’s  external  governance’.11  The  ‘external 
governance’ is based on ‘a rationalist bargaining process’ in which countries adopt 
certain rules, norms and values because the EU makes their adoption a “condition 
that  the  [countries]  have  to  fulfil  in  order  to  receive  EU  rewards”.12  This  type  of 
governance is criticised for the lack of sustainable internalisation as the rules, norms 
and values are sometimes adopted only in a period until ‘the reward’ comes.13 An 
alternative type of ‘external governance’ occurs through ‘the social learning model’ 
developed by the social constructivist approach, whereby countries adopt certain 
rules,  norms  and  values  because  they  have  “internalized  identities,  values  and 
norms” as a consequence of their interaction with EU.14 
Causes and Level of Corruption in BiH  
In  previous  years,  Transparency  International  has  routinely  placed  BiH  on  its 
corruption  perceptions  index  list  among  those  countries  with  widespread  and 
endemic  forms  of  corruption.15  According  to  these  and  similar  reports,  petty  and 
administrative  corruption  has  become  part  of  the  daily  routine  of  a  majority  of 
citizens in BiH.16 Other forms like “bribery, nepotism, embezzlement, the diversion of 
public  funds,  tax  fraud,  illegal  rent  seeking,  kick-back  schemes,  etc.”  occur  very 
                                                           
10 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
11 F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 
11, no. 4, 2004, p. 663. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., p. 664. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Transparency International, 2009 Corruption Perception Index, 2009. 
16 V. Devine & H. Mathisen, Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina – 2005, CMI Report, Bergen, 
2005, p. 7. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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often.17 Corruption is present in the following sectors: political, legal (justice), security 
(police  and  military)  and  economic  (state  owned  companies).18  Because  of  the 
country’s highly decentralised constitution, corruption occurs almost independently 
at the following levels: municipality, cantonal, entity and state level.19 Corruption is 
closely linked to organised crime that goes beyond the borders of BiH and is part of 
corruption paths in the Western Balkans region.20 In the early 2000s, legal provisions of 
criminal law on corruption dated from communist times; BiH did not have institutions 
specialised in assessing  and  dealing  with corruption and it  did  not  have  an  anti-
corruption  strategy.21  Although  citizens  of  BiH  actively  participate  in  corruption,  a 
majority of citizens perceive corruption as something wrong and list it as the second 
biggest problem in the country, just behind unemployment.22 
Since corruption exists in almost all areas of public life in BiH, it is important to identify 
what the possible root causes are. Following Hulsey, I argue that political parties are 
the root cause of corruption and the main obstacle to anti-corruption efforts.23 As 
Andreas  argues,  the  decisive  impact  on  the  development  of  three  nationalistic 
political  parties  in  BiH  (and  the  spreading  of  corruption)  was  “the  birth  of  a 
criminalized state” that occurred during the war.24 Political parties have successfully 
developed and maintained a system of structures within the political, legal, social, 
security, administrative, health and economic sectors that rely on and encourage 
corruption  as  a  (needed  and  almost  unavoidable)  system  of  functioning.25  This 
phenomenon  that  caused  corruption  to  flourish  can  be  explained  through  the 
process of establishing political parties in a post-communist period, their members’ 
profiles,  ranging  from  former  communist  prisoners,  and  war  lords  to  war-time 
                                                           
17 Ibid.  
18 Transparency International, 2009 Corruption Perception Index, op.cit. 
19 Ibid.  
20  A.  Politi,  “The  New  Dimensions  of  Organized  Crime  in  South-eastern  Europe”,  The 
International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 34, no. 4, 1999, pp. 49-58. 
21  M.  Pugh,  “Postwar  Political  Economy  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina:  The  Spoils  of  Peace”, 
Global Governance, no. 8, 2002, pp. 467-482.   
22 Transparency International, 2004 Corruption Perception Study, 2004. 
23 J.W. Hulsey, “‘Why Did They Vote for Those Guys Again?’ Challenges and Contradictions in 
the Promotion of Political Moderation in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Democratization, 
vol. 16, no. 6, 2010, pp. 1132-1152. 
24 P. Andreas, “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia”, International 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 48, no. 1, 2005, pp. 29-52.  
25 For more information see D. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, London, 
Cippenham Pluto Press, 2000, 2nd edn., p. 36. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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smugglers, and historical factors such as the privatisation of state-owned companies 
or the highly decentralised constitution.26  
Policy Objectives  
Policy  objectives  are  understood  as  “the  preparation,  definition  and  adoption  of 
policy  objectives”,  their  analysis  aims  to  identify  whether  they  are  ‘declaratory 
objectives’  or  whether  they  constitute  ‘intentions’,  and  how  far  they  take  into 
account  the  two  above-mentioned characteristics  of  the  structural  foreign  policy 
(comprehensiveness and sustainable internalisation).27 
Although  the  need  to  fight  corruption  was  recognised  by  the  Office  of  the  High 
Representative (OHR) in 1999,28 the EU’s support for anti-corruption efforts emerged 
in 2002 as a policy objective ‘almost out of nowhere’.29 The narrative of the 2002 
Council  Decision  on  deployment  of  the  EU  Police  Mission  to  BiH  presents  a  clear 
intention of the EU to support anti-corruption efforts in BiH.30 It furthermore shows the 
awareness of the link between political parties and corruption; the institution-building 
mandate of this police mission was to ensure that the police services in BiH are able 
to  “undertake the criminal investigation of corruption cases regardless of political 
implications”.31 At that time, no other existing EU instrument had been mandated to 
support  anti-corruption  efforts  directly.  After  the  failure  of  the  2006  constitutional 
reform, the EU started to widen its support for anti-corruption.32 The EU also shifted its 
objective  from  mandating  the  support  for  a  development  of  new  anti-corruption 
institutions to providing support for BiH authorities to implement their commitments 
towards  international  conventions  on  corruption  and  already  adopted,  but  not 
implemented,  national  anti-corruption  documents.33  Furthermore,  the  EU  set  the 
                                                           
26  See  also  D.  Chandler,  ”Anti-Corruption  Strategies  and  Democratization  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina“, Democratization, vol. 9, no. 2, 2010, pp. 101-120. 
27 Keukeleire, op.cit., p. 17. 
28 Office of the High Representative for BiH, A Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy for BiH, 
Sarajevo, 15 February 1999. 
29 Interview with an official 1, European Commission, via telephone, 5 April 2012. 
30  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Council  Joint  Action  on  the  European  Police  Mission, 
2002/210/CFSP, 11 March 2002, Annex 1, chapter II, paragraph 4. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Interview with an official 1, op.cit. 
33 Interview with an official 3, DG Enlargement, European Commission official, Brussels, 20 April 
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support for anti-corruption as an objective of its (financial) assistance.34 Statements 
made  by  some  top-level  EU  officials  clearly  indicated  that  the  fight  against 
corruption was a condition of progress towards accession.35 Despite the fact that the 
objective to support the fight against corruption went beyond a police mission and 
was integrated in aid and the enlargement process, the mandate of the EU Special 
Representative was widened to support anti-corruption only in September 2011.36 
In  the  case  of  BiH,  the  EU’s  support  for  anti-corruption  efforts  is  designed  in  two 
distinct  ways.  First,  the  EU  sets  effective  anti-corruption  policy  objectives  as  a 
condition for signing trade agreements or for providing aid. Second, the EU explicitly 
states that it will support anti-corruption efforts in BiH by creating ‘self-obligation’ (EU 
Police Mission in BiH).  
Even  though  the  EU  has  not  only  declaratory  policy  objectives  but  also  clear 
intentions, it should be noted that apart from a police mission, the EU’s objectives 
and intentions do not specify which structures, within which sector and at what level 
results are expected. Furthermore, assessed documents do not disclose any attempt 
to  tackle  the  root cause,  political  parties,  nor  whether  the  objective is  to create, 
influence or shape structures (again except for a police mission). It  also  does  not 
provide any information on whether the EU is aware of the time needed to achieve 
these objectives, nor whether the method to achieve this objective would be based 
on conditionality or socialisation. 
Policy Outputs  
The policy outputs stage should provide an analysis of whether these objectives have 
been translated into “concrete operational measures and decisions” by using policy 
instruments,  providing  financial  support,  personnel  and  investing  time  and  energy 
and how far they take into account  two characteristics  (comprehensiveness  and 
sustainable internalisation) of the structural foreign policy.37  
                                                           
34  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Decision  on  the  Principles,  Priorities  and  Conditions 
Contained in the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008/211/EC, Brussels, 
18 February 2008, annex, paragraph 3.1. 
35 Romano Prodi: “support for the region has been firmly linked to progress in the fight against 
political corruption, organised crime and peace efforts following a decade of civil conflict.”, 
in “Balkans EU entry ‘Irreversible’, says Prodi”, TheParliament.com, 21 June 2006.   
36  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Council  Decision  on  appointing  the  European  Union 
Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011/426/CFSP, 18 July 2011, Article 3 (e). 
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The policy instruments developed by the EU to support anti-corruption efforts in BiH 
aimed to influence structures within the legal and security sectors at the state and 
entity level. The Decision on deployment of the EU Police Mission to BiH foresaw a 
two-year mission with one headquarter and 24 monitoring units, a staff that would be 
seconded by the member states and financed by member states and from the EU 
budget.38 The instrument of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement that the EU 
concluded with BiH foresaw an obligation for BiH to foster the Western Balkans anti-
corruption cooperation.39 With this Agreement the EU aimed to influence structures 
within  the  political  sector  at  the  regional  level.  The  pre-accession  financial 
instruments (CARDS and IPA) are based on a strong conditionality, used to support 
projects that would influence structures within the legal and security sector at the 
state level.40 In May 2008, the Commission formulated nearly 50 requirements that BiH 
had to achieve in order to figure on the so-called white Schengen list, so that citizens 
of BiH could enter Schengen area without visa requirement.41 Some of the formu-
lated  requirements  were  directly  linked  to  the  prevention  of  corruption  and  fight 
against  corruption.42  With  the  Visa  Road  Map,  the  EU  aimed  to  influence  the 
structures within the legal sector at the state level.  
Depending on the decision and the instrument, the period of engagement varies: 
from two years for each EU Special Representative and the EU Police Mission to the 
five-year period for the IPA funds. No reference can be found to the intention of 
creating sustainable structures or to influencing mental structures. Interestingly, none 
of the instruments aimed to explicitly influence political parties. The period of two 
years for the EU Police Mission could not be seen as an awareness of a long-term 
commitment. Instruments were strongly based on conditionality (the Visa Road Map 
or financial instruments). On the other hand, the use of socialisation seems minimal 
(limited  to  BiH  police  staff  training  by  police  officers  from  EU  member  states), 
jeopardising long-term internalisation of new and/or changed structures. As already 
                                                           
38 Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action on the European Union Police Mission, 
op.cit., annex, chapter II, paragraph 4. 
39  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreement  Between  the 
European  Communities  and  Their  Member  States,  of  the  One  Part,  and  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, of the Other Part, 2008/0073 (AVC), Brussels, 6 June 2008, Article 6. 
40 European Commission, Regulation on Implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 
Establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), EC/718/2007, Brussels, 12 June 
2007, Article 7 (1h). 
41 European Stability Initiative, The Visa Roadmaps, 2012. 
42 European Commission, Visa Liberalisation with Bosnia and Herzegovina: Roadmap, Brussels, 
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mentioned, but important to note, the EU did not explicitly link the mandate of the EU 
Special Representative to the EU’s overall support for the anti-corruption efforts until 
September 2011.43 
Policy Implementation 
The policy implementation stage  of the analysis should provide an answer to the 
question of the extent to which these policy instruments, financial support, personnel 
and time and energy were actually used, and to what extent they take into account 
the two characteristics (comprehensiveness and sustainable internalisation)  of  the 
structural foreign policy.44  
The EU Police Mission was used to influence structures within the security sector at the 
state  level.  The  financial  framework  foreseen  for  the  mission  has  proven  to  be 
insufficient.45 Furthermore, there was a lack of expertise among the staff deployed, 
and their training prior to their deployment was insufficient, a great percentage of 
staff did not even have basic English skills.46 This mission, although it was not foreseen 
by  the  Council  Decision  that  launched  it,  has  engaged  in  conducting  public 
awareness campaigns and by doing so has tried to influence mental structures.47 
Out of 112 projects financed in BiH from 2007-2011, only two had as their main aim to 
support anti-corruption  efforts; and 3 million euros were provided for this purpose. 
These  projects  provided  analysis  and  advice  on  the legal  framework  and  on  the 
situation  of  the  BiH  Anti-Corruption  Strategy.48  Only  10  other  projects  mentioned 
support  for  anti-corruption  efforts  as  their  sub-goal.49  The  EU  financial  instruments 
were used to influence structures within the legal sector at the state level.50  
Although some projects aiming at influencing structures within other sectors and on 
other levels could be linked to anti-corruption efforts, they do not explicitly mention 
                                                           
43  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Council  Decision  on  Appointing  the  European  Union 
Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007/427/CFSP, Brussels, 18 June 2007. 
44 Keukeleire, op.cit., p. 17. 
45 A.E. Juncos, “Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in M. Emerson & E. Gross (eds.), 
Evaluating the EU’s Crisis Missions in the Balkans, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
2007, p. 63. 
46 Ibid.  
47 European Union Police Mission to BiH, Campaigns, 2012. 
48 Ibid. 
49 European Commission, DG Enlargement, Financial Assistance Overview, 2012. 
50 Ibid. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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corruption but support public administration reform instead.51 It is therefore possible 
to conclude that the focus is on structures within a small number of sectors and levels 
and  that  there  is  an  absence  of  a  comprehensive  approach  and  awareness  of 
aiming to create sustainable structures.  
Depending on the instruments used, the timeframe of implementation was as short 
as several months for the EU Police Mission public awareness campaigns to as long 
as  two  years  for  the  IPA  projects.  Some  experts  underlined  that  although  some 
missions would last for a decade, their official mandate is usually set for two years (EU 
Police  Mission),  and  then  prolonged,  which  leaves  little  time  to  make  long-term 
commitments and changes.52 
The visa liberalisation process shows that the EU policy implementation stage is based 
on  strong  conditionality  and  minimal  socialisation  efforts,  jeopardising  long-term 
internalisation of structures.53 The visa liberalisation process resulted in some progress: 
the EU insisted on the implementation of the 2006 Strategy to Fight Corruption, and 
on the adoption and the implementation of the Action Plans with a clear timeframe 
and sufficient human and financial resources for the Anti-Corruption Agency, with an 
aim  to  strengthen  institutional  capacity  and  coordination.  The  EU  furthermore 
provided some initial funding for the newly established Agency.54 
Policy Outcomes 
The policy outcomes analysis should provide insights regarding the concrete policy 
results and their actual effect.55  Research findings on the actual effect of the EU 
policy of support for the anti-corruption efforts in BiH show that the results are not 
remarkable. Experts agree that the EU Police Mission has achieved some progress, 
but  the  goal  of  making  BiH  police  services  politically  independent  and  able  to 
investigate corruption cases was not achieved.56 Despite the fact that almost 98% of 
the  people  stated  in  2000  that  corruption  was  widespread  in  BiH  and  that  they 
perceived it as something negative, the EU Police Mission invested time and funds in 
                                                           
51 European Commission, Public Administration Reform, IPA National Programme 2011 – Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 2012. 
52 A.E. Juncos, “Europeanization by Decree? The Case of Police Reform in Bosnia”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 49, no. 2,  2011, pp. 367-389. 
53 G. Knaus & A. Stiglmayer, Gewiner, “Verlierer und die Zukunft des Visaghettos ‘Balkan’”, 
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54 Interview with a former official 2, European Commission, via Skype, 19 April 2012. 
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organising public awareness campaigns.57 Some progress has been achieved on a 
regional level, the EU has funded the work of the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative 
for South Eastern Europe, which provided some results in collecting data.58 Results of 
the visa liberalisation process are better, the Strategy for the Fight against Corruption 
and the 2009-2014 Action Plan for the Fight against Corruption59 and a law on the 
establishment of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and the Coordination of 
the Fight Against Corruption were adopted.60 However, the Agency is still not working 
at full capacity; the selection of the director of this agency was a long and painful 
process and the budget is sufficient for salaries of only a few employees.61 
The  EU  policy  in  BiH  has  provided  results  in  structures  within  a  limited  number  of 
sectors (legal and security) at a limited number of levels (state and regional). This 
policy  has  resulted  in  changes  to  existing  structures  (police  forces)  and  in  the 
creation of new structures (State Anti-Corruption Agency). These new structures have 
proven to be insufficient (police forces still not capable of investigating) and not self-
sustainable (Agency not working properly), making the policy not internalised.  
Conclusion 
This essay has attempted to answer the question of the extent to which the EU’s rule 
of law promotion policy in BiH through the support for anti-corruption efforts can be 
seen as structural foreign policy. Using the SFP conceptual framework combined with 
theoretical  elements  from  other  academic  approaches  (notably  enlargement 
literature), we found that although the EU has set the promotion of the rule of law 
and  the  support  for  the  anti-corruption  efforts  high  on  its  agenda,  it  has  not 
managed to identify the root cause of corruption (political parties), develop and 
implement  a  comprehensive  policy  that  would  tackle  the  negative  impact  that 
corruption has on the overall progress in BiH, and provide satisfactory policy results. 
The  absence  of  tangible  results  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  EU  does 
neither address the root cause of corruption (the political parties) nor the various 
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structures  within  the  legal  and  security  sectors.  This  would,  however,  be  required 
given  the  highly  decentralised  political  system  of  BiH  in  which  different  levels 
(municipality,  cantonal,  entity  and  state)  are  key  to  the  stability  of  the  country. 
Furthermore, citizens of BiH perceive corruption as something negative. Therefore, 
attempts  to  influence  mental  structures  should  not  focus  on  explaining  why 
corruption is negative, but on how citizens can participate in anti-corruption efforts.  
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3.  Promoting Justice Abroad: An Analysis of the EU’s Rule of Law Promotion 




Since  Ukraine’s  independence  in  1991,  the  Rule  of  Law  (RoL)  has  been  facing 
extreme perils, struggling to leave behind 60 years of totalitarian rule, and muddling 
through a very unstable political pathway of post-Communist transformation. Eight 
years after the Orange Revolution hopeful signals seem more distant than ever. The 
controversial  case  of  Yulia  Tymoshenko  has  come  to  stand  as  a  symbol  for  the 
continuous application of ‘selective justice’ by the Ukrainian political elite.  
In this essay, we aim to examine how committed the EU has been in fostering the RoL 
in Ukraine, the so-called ‘pioneer’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). By 
applying the structural foreign policy (SFP) framework, we focus on the outcomes of 
RoL promotion, thereby taking up an explicit ‘outside-in’ perspective. After updating 
the  SFP  conceptual  framework,  we  shortly  look  at  the  EU’s  approach  to  RoL 
promotion, before turning to the actual RoL reform record in Ukraine.   
 
Updating the Structural Foreign Policy Framework 
Operationalising the ‘Rule of Law’ and Defining the Independence of the Judiciary 
Definitions  of  the  RoL  vary  according  to  contextual  factors  and  from  author  to 
author;1 it is an ‘essentially contested concept’.2 Following Kaplan, we argue that 
any conceptualisation must purposefully serve the theoretical approach we apply,3 
that is, structural foreign policy. Against this background, the classic distinction made 
by  Craig  (among  others)  between  formal  and  substantial  RoL  seems  particularly 
relevant  as  it  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  distinction  between  conventional  and 
structural  foreign  policy  (see  Introduction).4  A  formal  conception  of  the  RoL 
essentially  prescribes  the  separation  of  law  from  politics  and  the  accompanying 
conditions ensuring that separation. A substantial definition, on the other hand, goes 
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Law, vol. 2, no. 1, 2010, p. 48. 
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Framework”, Public Law, vol. 20, no. 4, 1997, pp. 467-487. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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beyond these procedural or formal aspects, and implies in particular that rights and 
liberties  are  guaranteed.  It  means  that  the  RoL  is  internalised  as  a p ermanent 
organising principle for attaining justice.  
The independent judiciary system is the primary guardian or controlling mechanism 
of the RoL.5 Both policy-makers as well as academics generally follow the mantra 
that judicial independence protects and enhances the RoL, and that its viability is 
enhanced in a democratic environment. We claim that a strong distinction between 
de jure and de facto independence of the judiciary should be made and that the 
very independence of the judiciary can only be assessed by looking at its outcome. 
From the citizen’s point of view, an independent judiciary system translates essentially 
in the right to a fair trial. This implies aspects such as a reasonable procedural period, 
‘access  to  justice’,  an  impartial  prosecutor,  and  the  effective  implementation  of 
judicial  decisions.  In  our  analysis,  we  will  adopt  a  substantial  perspective  towards 
judicial independence that enables us to ‘check’ the actual internalisation of the 
RoL, looking beyond de jure independence. 
 
Rule of Law Promotion as Structural Foreign Policy 
Table 1 displays a typology of RoL promotion conceptualised as SFP. Rather than a 
strict theoretical model, the table aims to illustrate the operationalisation of the SFP 
framework for the EU’s promotion of an independent judiciary. 
Table 1: Updated Typology – Dominant vs. Neglected Dimensions of Foreign Policy 
 
Conventional RoL Promotion       Structural RoL Promotion 





Justice and Home Affairs 
agenda 
collective interests  other-regarding interests: 
Judicial Independence 
Security  territorial security and stability      collective and human security 
Power and 
capabilities 
material and hard power       immaterial and soft power  
Means    hierarchy, no ownership, 
exclusive, unilateral 
    horizontal relationship, local 
ownership, inclusiveness 
Focus  procedural RoL promotion      substantive RoL promotion 
Policy 
Indicators 
strengthening executive law 
enforcement, procuration, 




independence, access to 
justice 
Source: compiled by the author. 
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This typology represents a continuum rather than a clear distinction and that both 
categories are complementary rather than exclusionary. The ‘policy indicators’ give 
us an idea of what type of RoL promotion policies correspond to both dimensions. 
The interests and security dimensions need further explanation. 
Interests and Objectives 
In terms of interests, reference is made to George and Keohane’s concepts of self-
regarding  interests,  collective  interests,  and  other-regarding  interests.6  As  for  the 
objectives, we use the distinction made by Cremona7 and Wichmann8, who split up 
the  external  dimension  of  the  EU’s  fundamental  values  –  such  as  the  RoL  –  in 
constitutive and instrumentalist interpretations. Following the former, the promotion of 
the RoL is an objective in its own right as it reflects the promotion of internal values 
that constitute the Union’s own identity. According to the latter, the RoL agenda 
serves other foreign policy goals related to (self-interested) economic or security and 
stability interests. 
Security 
The policy issues of migration, terrorism and cross-border crime show that internal and 
external security dimensions are intertwined. Consequently, the EU’s self-interested 
security  interests  of  RoL  promotion  take  place  in  the  European  neighbourhood 
through the so-called external dimension of the Justice and Home Affairs (ED-JHA) 
policies.9 This ‘conventional’ promotion of the RoL, or rather of ‘rule and order’, is 
clearly self-interested since it explicitly aims to ensure internal stability and security 
through  foreign  policy.  A  ‘structural’  RoL  promotion,  on  the  contrary,  implies  the 
promotion  of  security  for  the  individual  against  arbitrariness  of  the  state  and 
guarantees legal certainty.  
However, strengthening conventional security could also be structural, as it provides 
the necessary ‘security umbrella’ in which the RoL can develop in a structural way. 
Indeed, it is only by strengthening the executive law enforcement (making sure that 
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criminals are arrested and effectively prosecuted by the procuration) that the acts of 
an independent judiciary can have their merit. 
 
Measuring Internalisation: ‘Layers of Impact’ 
A final update to the SFP framework is the qualification of the degree of ‘internalisa-
tion’ of the RoL. In order not to limit ourselves to legal and institutional change, but to 
include behavioural change, we take over the ‘layers of impact’ model designed by 
Morlino  and  Magen  as  a  guideline  for  our  empirical  analysis.10  The  model 
differentiates between three ‘layers’ of impact an external actor can have on the 
domestic level: Rule Adoption (RA), meaning the transposition of rules, standards and 
norms into domestic legislation; Rule Implementation (RImp), or the transformation of 
governing institutions and administrative structures that need to implement changes; 
and finally, Rule Internalisation (RInt), which is the very acceptance of the transferred 
rules by the elite as well as the population. The instigation of this chain of impact is 
dependent on a credible commitment of the international actor (EU) on the one 
hand, and on political will of change agents within the target country (Ukraine) on 
the  other  hand.  Moreover,  a  shift  in  the  cost-benefit  analysis  in  favour  of  the 
promoted rules and institutions is needed to make decision-makers opt for RA.  
Figure 1 below displays an updated SFP matrix, indicating the sectors and levels this 
essay will concentrate on, extended with the three layers of impact model.  
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Figure 1: Updated Structural Foreign Policy Matrix 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
Inside-out: Is the EU’s Promotion of Rule of Law à la carte?  
When  the  EU p romotes  RoL  in  Ukraine,  does  it  follow  a  conventional  or  rather  a 
structural foreign policy approach? Does the ‘constitutive’ or the ‘instrumentalist’ RoL 
promotion  objectives  prevail?  The  analysis  of  the  relevant  EU p rogramming 
documents for Ukraine show that the EU’s approach depends both on the policy 
field and the policy framework.11 
 
The ENP: Between ‘Constitutive’ Values and Self-Regarding Interests 
The relevant ENP programming documents12 predominantly maintain a ‘constitutive’ 
vision on the RoL: it is promoted as an objective in its own right. However, the reform 
of  the  judiciary  is  also  often  mentioned  as  an  instrument  for  addressing  (self-
interested) ‘security concerns’ such as terrorism, organised crime, trafficking in drugs 
and  arms,  as  well  as  an  instrument  to  strengthen  cooperation  in  migration  and 
asylum.  Very  recently,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Arab  uprisings,  the  RoL  promotion 
agenda has become much more ‘substantial’ as it aims to build ‘deep democracy’, 
where “the rule of law [is] administered by an independent judiciary and right to a 
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fair trial”.13 Nevertheless, the state-focused and institutionalist bias of policy interven-
tions is heavily present and thus “undermines the milieu goal character”.14 
 
The ‘Developmental’ Approach of the EIDHR 
The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is a thematic 
instrument aimed at providing support for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights.  The  EIDHR  adopts  a d evelopmental  approach  since  it  works  exclusively 
through civil society organisations active in the promotion of these values.15 There-
fore, the degree of inclusiveness and local ownership is high. EIDHR clearly promotes 
the RoL as a ‘constitutive’ value by stressing the independence of the judiciary in 
terms of equality before the law and access to justice.16  
 
The JHA Agenda: ‘Instrumental’ Means for Self-Regarding Interests 
The ED-JHA is by nature a self-interested policy, which makes the RoL promotion an 
‘instrumental’ objective. Within this policy field, the strengthening of the judiciary is 
consistently set out in terms of efficiency as it is needed to complement the EU’s 
internal security agenda for fighting crime and terrorism.17 The interaction between 
the  EU  and  Ukraine  is  organised  on  an  intergovernmental  level  through  political 
dialogue and maintains a conditionality-like or rational ‘cost-benefit’ methodology.  
 
An Outside-in Perspective on Rule of Law Promotion in Ukraine 
The State of the RoL in post-Soviet Ukraine 
Within  the  Soviet  system,  political,  legal,  economic  and  ideological  powers  were 
fused  and  monopolised  by  the  communist  party.  The  politico-legal  paradigm  of 
‘socialist legality’ served to protect this system and stood in direct contrast with the 
‘capitalist’ principle of the RoL. It made the law a subservient institution to sustain the 
                                                           
13 Commission of the European Communities & High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy,  Joint  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: A 
New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303, 25 May 2011, p. 3.    
14 Wichmann, op.cit., p. 63.   
15  Directorate-General  Development  and  Cooperation  –  EuropeAid,  “The  European 
Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights”, 17 February 2012.  
16 Wichmann, op.cit., pp. 71-72.  
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regime and to direct a political course.18 Therefore, Ukraine’s transition towards a 
democratic regime faces three main challenges as far as the establishment of a fully 
independent judiciary guarding the separation of powers is concerned.    
Firstly, the judicial branch is still underdeveloped. Interestingly, the politics of ‘rule by 
law’ in the Soviet system provided a frame of stability, structure and discipline for the 
judicial system and gave it the means to create and shape order in society (albeit in 
a dictatorial way). The collapse of the Soviet regime resulted in a ‘legal vacuum’ 
with no Ukrainian legal traditions and institutions to fill up the gap. The disappear-
ance of this top-down system meant that the judiciary could not rely anymore on the 
executive power which previously guaranteed its institutional capacity.19 The training 
of judges needs to be adapted to modern standards so as to set up a system in 
which  the  decision  for  selection  or  promotion  of  judges  is  based  on  merit  and 
competence and no longer on political loyalty. 20  
Secondly,  within  the  executive  branch,  the  old  instinct  remains  as  if  the  judicial 
apparatus  was  part  of  a  unified  state  structure  and  in  fact  an  instrument  of 
government  policy.21  This  applies  particularly  to  the  prosecutor-general’s  office 
which  was  during  Soviet  times  the  most  important  supportive  institution  of  the 
Communist Party.22   
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, there is a need to overcome an old legal 
culture, where the law is no longer being thought of as the ‘will of the rulers’, but as 
the ‘will of the people’. This change is needed in the minds of the elite as much as in 
that  of  the  citizens,  since  the  law  derives  its  legitimacy  and  enforcement  mainly 
through voluntary compliance.23  
In short, the collapse of the Soviet-Union was anything but a simple and strict legal 
problem  for  the  RoL  and  the  judiciary.  There  is  a n eed  for  a  simultaneous  and 
comprehensive  shift  in  political,  legal  and  societal  sectors,  at  individual,  societal, 
                                                           
18  H.  Oda,  “The  Emergence  of  Pravovoe  Gosudarstvo  (Rechtsstaat)  in  Russia”,  Review  of 
Central and East European Law, vol. 25, no. 3, 1999, pp. 373-374. 
19  Interview  with  Arkadiy  Bushchenko,  executive  director  of  the  Ukrainian  Helsinki  Human 
Rights Union, Kiev, 27 March, 2012.  
20 K. Hendley, Trying to Make Law Matter: Legal Reform and Labor Law in the Soviet Union, 
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996, p. 124.  
21  P.  D’Anieri,  “What  Has  Changed  in  Ukrainian  Politics?  Assessing  the  Implications  of  the 
Orange Revolution”, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 5, 2005, p. 90. 
22 K. Malfliet, De geest van het russische recht, Leuven, Acco, 2010, p. 80. 
23  K.  Ratushny,  “Toward  the  ‘independence…  of  judges’  in  Ukraine?”,  Saskatchewan  Law 
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professional and elite levels (police and civil servants, the parliament, businessmen, 
law schools, judges, and ordinary citizens), indicating a collective action problem. 
The old habit of political interference in the judicial branch needs to be broken. At 
the same time, the judicial sector needs institution- and capacity-building. Moreover, 
these  changes  can  only  sustain  for  as  long  as  they  are  accompanied  by  a 
simultaneous change of legal culture.  
 
Two Decades of Justice Reform in Ukraine: Neglecting the Political Sector  
In this final part we investigate to which extent the EU’s RoL promotion activities have 
led to structural outcomes. We make use of the analytical framework and adjacent 
concepts of RA, RImp, and RInt so as to illustrate the degree of ‘internalisation’ of RoL 
promotion.  
Until 2004, Ukraine’s commitment to the independent judiciary was very weak, and 
EU-Ukraine relations were in general quite cold under President Kuchma (1994-2004). 
As in the 1990s the EU predominantly focused on the preparation of the Central and 
Eastern European countries for their accession to the EU, the Council of Europe was 
the major external actor promoting judicial reform in Ukraine. It was partly because 
of the latter’s extensive pressure that some ‘small justice reforms’ were adopted in 
2002. Relations with Kuchma stagnated during his second term when he pursued an 
increasingly  authoritarian  rule.  On  a  judicial  level,  it  meant  there  was  almost  no 
progress,  since  the  oligarchic  clans  that  came  to  organise  themselves  around 
Kuchma captured the courts. As a consequence, he vetoed many draft laws on 
strengthening judicial independence.24 Soviet practices remained recurrent as the 
judiciary  was  often  treated  as  being  part  of  the  civil  service  and  continuously 
received instructions.25  
From Kuchma’s rule onwards, EU-Ukraine relations also became complicated by the 
‘membership issue’. Both sides were no longer on the same wave length, Kiev was 
waiting  for  a  clear  membership  commitment  from  Brussels  to  encourage  reform, 
whereas Brussels demanded an improvement of Ukraine’s record of reform before 
                                                           
24 T. Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3, 2006, 
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24 D’Anieri, op.cit., p. 90. 
25 H. van Zon, “Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism Under Leonid Kuchma”, Problems of 
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opening the door of accession.26 Knowing that the first phase of ‘Rule Adoption’ (RA) 
is dependent on both credible commitment of the EU and the political will of the 
Ukrainian political elite, it is therefore clear that all three phases of RA, RImp, and RInt 
were unthinkable until 2004. 
This  started  to  change  slightly  in  2004  when  the  EU  launched  the  ENP  and  things 
evolved  in  Kiev.  The  Orange  Revolution  brought  a  pro-EU  and  pro-democratic 
government to power. This period was of great significance for the independence of 
the  judiciary.  As  many  millions  took  the  streets  to  protest  against  the  fraudulent 
elections, the Supreme Court found the courage to nullify the second round of the 
presidential elections. All sides in the dispute, as well as the citizens, accepted the 
independent  role  of  the  Court.27  However,  soon  it  became  clear  that,  despite 
glorifying  words  of  democratic  change,  practices  of  politicisation  of  the  judicial 
system persisted and reforms were not implemented. Within society, feelings of hope 
were soon replaced by feelings of disillusionment and cynicism.  
Nevertheless, under the pressure of the EU and the Council of Europe, some initial RA 
was  triggered.  In  November  2005,  a  Decree  of  President  Yushchenko  set  up  a 
‘National Commission on Strengthening Democracy and Rule of Law’. This resulted a 
year  later  in  the  approval  of  a  ‘Strategy  Plan  for  improving  the  justice  system  to 
ensure the right to a fair trial’ and the draft ‘Law on the Reform of the Judiciary’. Yet, 
notwithstanding continuous promises, the president and parliament did not succeed 
in adopting any final legislation. Especially in areas of political corruption or abuse of 
office, no progress was made, resulting in a continued selective or arbitrary attitude 
towards the law.28 Judicial independence reached an all-time low during the 2007 
Constitutional Crisis, when President Yushchenko fired several judges of the Constitu-
tional Court, who wanted to annul his decision to dissolve the parliament.29 
With the election of Yanukovych in 2010, the political will on Ukrainian side further 
decreased when the new president slowed down the European integration course. 
However,  the  Rada  did  adopt  the  long-prepared  ‘Law  on  the  Judiciary  and  the 
Status  of  Judges’.30  The  Yanukovych  administration  largely  took  over  the  existing 
concept law, yet excluded essential provisions or amended others, which distorted 
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its  whole  strength.  In  fact,  it  was  clearly  an  intent  to  facilitate  pressure  on  the 
judiciary.31 In short, whereas the 2010 legislation on the judiciary finally signalled the 
initiation  of  effective  RA  in  justice  reform,  it  is  clear  that  the  government  tried  to 
maintain,  if  not increase,  its  de  facto  influence  on  the  courts.  Thus  far  no  serious 
phases of RImp, let alone RInt, have taken place in the judicial sector.  
It  is  clear  that  the  continuous  politically  unstable  climate  is  to  a l arge  extent  an 
obstacle for serious reforms of the judiciary. Trochev argues that the EU, just as many 
other  Western  aid  providers,  was  misled  by  the  post-Orange  leadership.  They 
became entrapped in their ‘narrow’ judicial sector support.32 Ukraine is no stand-
alone  case  in  which  international  RoL  aid providers  become  ‘entrapped’  in  their 
strong institutional fixation. An often-cited problem considers the programmes that 
provide computers and software to improve the efficiency of case management. 
These systems can be manipulated, so that the improved speed of case assignment 
might aggravate rather than improve the independence of the judiciary.33 Similar 
observations  by  RoL  promoters  in  Ukraine  were  made  where  computerised  case 
assignment software could be manually bypassed to assign a judge to a case.34 A 
second  example  is  the  setting  up  of  semi-autonomous  judicial  councils  in  the 
selection  and  appointment  process  of  judges.  In  Ukraine,  this  ‘High  Council  of 
Justice’ is strongly populated by executive and parliamentary representatives and 
has  in  fact  become  one  of  the  main  levers  through  which  both  branches  try  to 
influence  judges.35  Without  tackling  the  political  sector,  trying  to  build  judicial 
independence through institutions is like trying to dry out a flooded room without 
turning  off  the  taps:  “the  underlying  maladies  of  the  original  institutions  end  up 
crossing over and infecting the new institutions”36. 
 
Conclusion 
The EU’s conception of RoL promotion is rather dependent on the goal it is serving: in 
a JHA context, the RoL takes the form of an instrument serving security concerns, 
whereas  in  the  ENP  framework,  the  RoL  and  independence  of  the  judiciary  is 
presented more as a constitutive value or as a goal in itself.  
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The  EU’s  structural  RoL  promotion  is,  however,  limited  to  the  first  phase  of  rule 
adoption,  far  from  the  phases  of  actual  internalisation.  This  indicates  a  lack  of 
political will on the Ukrainian side as well as a lack of credible commitment of the EU. 
A study of the Ramzukov Centre on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action 
Plan indeed confirms that despite some considerable success in certain sectors, the 
judicial  branch  and  corruption  remained  one  of  the  most  problematic  areas, 
requiring the strongest political capital.37  
The main activity of the EU is still based on political dialogue with the government as 
main contact.38 This ‘conventional’ RoL promotion, with a preference for top-down 
programmes  where  governments  –  instead  of  the civil society  –  are  the  principal 
partners, neglect the fact that this approach is not the most efficient. In that sense, 
our  case  further  confirms  Goldston’s  general  observation  that  there  exists  some 
general negligence by RoL donors that ‘partner’ governments can sometimes  be 
the very obstacle to reform.39 
The EU’s RoL promotion lacks a ‘comprehensive’ approach. It looks at the institution 
of  ‘law’  in  a  narrow,  institutionalist  and  instrumentalist  way.  Judicial  reform 
programmes were not tackling the political sector, where continued ‘selective use of 
justice’  is  the  main  cause  for  judicial  dependence.  Therefore,  judicial  support 
initiatives risk being inefficient since the problem of political capture has not been 
overcome. This limitation is of course inherent to the limited ambition of the ENP. As it 
tries  to  organise  intense  external  relationships  with  neighbours,  but  offers  no 
membership  prospects,  the  EU  has  no  real  leverage  to  address  this  political 
dimension. Although the EU helped to foster the maturation of the judicial sector, the 
observed collective  action  problem  of judicial  independence  teaches us  that  no 
real improvement is to be expected as long as the political elite cannot be brought 
to respect the RoL. 
    
                                                           
37 Ramzukov Centre, Ukraine-EU: From the Action Plan to an Enhance Agreement, op.cit., pp. 
146-172. 
38 Interview with operational expert at the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, Kiev, 
29 March 2012. 
39 Goldston, James, “The Rule of Law at Home and Abroad”, Hague Journal of the Rule of 
Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 2009, pp. 41-42. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
32 




This essay analyses gender and gender mainstreaming in the European Union’s (EU) 
foreign  policy  towards  Armenia  through  the  lenses  of  Keukeleire’s  concept  of 
structural foreign policy (SFP). This concept may be best understood as an umbrella-
like research framework that allows to merge different analytical viewpoints, drawn 
from the whole set of social science-related academic works. As a matter of fact, 
the SFP perspective is here used as an over-arching ‘meta-theory’ which drives the 
whole analysis, following a deductive approach.  
The  main question  we  intend  to  answer  is:  to  what  extent  has  the  EU  managed, 
through gender mainstreaming, to re-structure gender roles’ perceptions as well as 
social and legal structures concerning women in Armenia? Two underlying questions 
will also be addressed in the analysis: does an ‘EU gender model’ really exist and if 
yes, is it actually promoted towards third countries through the practice of ‘gender 
mainstreaming’? 
Our main hypothesis is that the EU’s growing intervention might have led to changes 
in gender roles, not only at a micro/meso level (cognitive, societal) but also at an 
institutional level (rule of law concerning women’s rights). The main obstacle to the 
thorough application of the EU’s gender model seems to be the ‘implementation 
deficit’. Factors explaining this deficit may be both ‘structural’ (cognitive and social 
structures opposing and/or rejecting the EU’s gender model) and institutional (lack of 
enforcement mechanism, adequate resources and monitoring). The main challenge 
for  the  EU’s  action  is  to  understand  how  to  strengthen  the  implementation 
mechanisms  through  a  gradual  re-shaping  of  those  structural  conditions  which 
negatively affect women’s self-perceptions as autonomous actors and, in particular, 
their involvement in economic and political activities. 
 
EU Foreign Policy and Gender: Complementing the SFP Framework 
Updating the SFP Framework 
The use of SFP for our analysis is justified by its ability to bridge the gap between the 
theoretical understanding of the EU’s foreign policy and the empirical validation of Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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its impact on the ground. Given the complexity of a concept such as ‘gender’, and 
indeed its multi-dimensional character, the SFP analytical framework is a suitable tool 
to address the main questions of this research work. As Table 1 shows, however, we 
suggest complementing the various dimensions of the policy-making and evaluation 
cycle by using inputs from the EU socialisation literature.   
Table 1: Policy-Making and Policy-Evaluation Cycle 
 
1.  Policy Objectives 
 
  Declaratory 
  Intentional  
 
  Preparation 
  Definition 
  Adoption  
 
2.  Policy Output 
 
  Policy instruments 
  Decisions  
 
  Operational measures 
  Budget 
  Personnel  
  Time/energy 
 
3.  Policy 
Implementation 
 
  Symbolic 
  Fragmented 
  All-embracing  
 
  Monitoring  
  Reporting 
  Evaluation 
 
4.  Policy Outcome 
 
  Policy results 
  Effects 
  Relevance 
 
  Follow-up 
  Best practice 
Sources: S. Keukeleire, “Structural Foreign Policy”, 2013 (forthcoming), pp. 17-18; L. Delcour & 
E. Tulmets (eds.), Pioneer Europe? Testing the EU Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood, Baden-
Baden, Nomos, 2008. 
 
Policy objectives essentially refer to the EU official documents setting up the ENP’s 
action  framework  towards  Armenia,  such  as  the  Country  Strategy  Papers  (CSPs), 
Commission  Proposals  and  ENP  Action  Plans  (APs).  Policy  output  and  Policy 
implementation will be described through the analysis of project documents and the 
project planning matrix (PPM) provided to me by the EU Delegation in Armenia; in 
addition,  the  2011  Progress  Report  on  Implementation  will  also  be  taken  into 
account.1  The  review  of  policy  outcomes  will  be  conducted  on  the  basis  of  my 
personal interviews with EU officials in Brussels and, when possible, it will try to provide 
a preliminary answer to the question of the long-term sustainability of changes. 
 
Is There an EU Gender Model? 
Throughout  the  process  of  European  integration,  the  issue  of  gender  has  been 
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extensively included in the EU’s political agenda and gender equality in the work-
place  has  been  highlighted  as  one  of  the  main  components  of  the  EU’s  social 
dimension. However, feminist literature stresses three main shortcomings.2 Firstly, the 
EU’s  equality  agenda  is  somehow  limited  to  the  policy  area  of  employment. 
Secondly,  the  principle  of  mainstreaming  is  to  a  certain  extent  a  symbolic  effort 
towards gender equality and its effectiveness is still under scrutiny. Thirdly, the EU’s 
gender dimension remains closely linked to economic objectives; it therefore ensures 
formal equality but does not thoroughly address the substantial causes for inequality.  
From a feminist standpoint, gender equality can only be achieved if gender policies 
are designed so as to influence all the components of gender regimes - paid work, 
care, income, time and voice - given that “gender equality in the labour market 
alone is unattainable, because of systemic connections to inequalities in families, 
politics and civil society”.3 This all-encompassing understanding theorises the gender 
regime’s concept as a crystalised order composed by production relations, power 
hierarchies, emotional relations (sexuality) and symbolic relations.4 All these elements, 
moving throughout the continuum from domestic to public sphere, determine the 
degree of gender inequality characterising a given gender regime.5   
It is therefore possible to speak of an EU gender model, even though its main focus is 
women’s  employment  rights  (see  Table  2).  The  underlying  rationale  of  this  model 
consists in establishing the most appropriate conditions to ensure the EU’s economic 
growth  and  fair  competition  in  the  common  market.  Citizenship  and  the  private 
sphere  dimensions  (family  policies,  domestic  violence  and  sexuality)  are  far  from 
being effectively and uniformly tackled from a gender perspective. Furthermore, the 
existence of a commonly agreed ‘EU gender model’ is challenged by the high level 
of differentiation amongst member states’ gender regimes.  
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Sources: J. Kantola, Gender and the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2010; S. Walby, 
“The European Union and Gender Equality: Emergent Varieties of Gender Regime”, Social 
Politics, vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 4-29; G. Pascall & J. Lewis, “Emerging Gender Regimes and 
Policies for Gender Equality in a Wider Europe”, Journal of Social Policy, vol. 33, no. 3, 2004, 
pp.  373-394;  M.  Bell,  “Sexual  orientation  and  anti-discriminatory  policy:  The  European 
Community”, in T. Carver & V. Mottier (eds.), Politics of Sexuality: Identity, Gender, Citizenship, 
London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 58-67. 
 
Gender Mainstreaming in the EU’s Foreign Policy 
Gender  mainstreaming  (a  soft  law  tool  which  includes  practices  such  as  bench-
marking, guidelines and targets) has been advocated as a potentially feminist tool 
to include gender issues in all EU policy areas. In the EU’s decision-making process, it 
has provided “new opportunities and innovative policy instruments for ‘engendering’ 
EU policies that have traditionally been ‘gender blind”.6  
Gender  mainstreaming  has  had  a  considerable  impact  on  those  policy  areas 
already tackling gender issues such as employment, education and training, while 
“in  other  ‘gender  blind’  EU  policy  areas  such  as  the Internal  Market,  competition 
policy, trade, energy, transport and external relations, mainstreaming has, so far, had 
less impact”.7 The issue of gender has been included in the European Neighbour-
hood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) but there is no clear definition of how it will 
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be actually mainstreamed. The budgetary support for Armenia over the period 2007-
13  (€75  million)  aimed  for  instance  at  strengthening  the  country’s  administrative 
capabilities  but  it  could  not  directly  influence  the  adoption  of  gender-related 
actions.8 For the year 2011, only €16.49 million have been invested in ENP countries to 
promote  women’s  rights  and  economic  empowerment.9  However,  the  inclusive 
nature of the ENPI, where basically the whole set of EU priorities is taken into account, 
gives the impression that “gender equality becomes everybody’s – and nobody’s – 
responsibility”.10  
 
Adding an Outside-in Perspective: Role and Self-Perception of Women in post-Soviet 
Armenia 
The analysis of the EU’s gender policy towards Armenia requires to briefly look at the 
economic and social role and self-perception of women in post-Soviet Armenia in 
order to assess whether the EU’s instruments (gender mainstreaming) are adapted 
and capable to yield results on the ground. The transition and post-transition period 
was characterised by the restructuring of the economy which had a very negative 
impact by raising the overall unemployment – over 26 million jobs disappeared in less 
than one decade and more than half were covered by women11 – and worsening 
market  access  conditions.  These  changes  were  not  gender-neutral  and 
consequently,  women’s  status  in  the  job  market  deteriorated  considerably, 
especially if we consider their impossibility to emerge in the raising private sector.12 
Although  women  have  never  been  completely  free  from  the  double  burden  of 
simultaneously carrying on their paid job and housework, in the aftermath of 1989 the 
increasingly deteriorating situation relegated women again to all the set of activities 
related to unpaid work  (housework,  child  and  elderly  care)  or  informal  work.  The 
main  consequence  of  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  was  the  return  of  the 
traditional  ‘male  bread-winner  model’,  notwithstanding  the  great  difficulties  that 
men also encountered in finding a job in that period.13 
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According to Ishkanian, the worsened position of women in the labour market in the 
post-Soviet countries has not solely been produced by the inner rationale of the neo-
liberal reforms, but it has also drawn on cultural, or better cognitive, elements such as 
traditional  gender-related  stereotypes  defining  roles  for  men  and  women.14  Two 
main  social  images  have  indeed  been  characterising  Armenian  women’s  self-
perception,  notably  the  binomials  ‘woman-mother’  and  ‘woman-protector  of  the 
family’.  From  an  anthropological  perspective,  the  concept  of  motherhood, 
traditionally  considered  sacral  and  associated  with  images  of  the  woman  as  the 
‘pillar’ and the ‘light’ of the family, is closely related with that of nationhood through 
the element of kinship as basic societal unit. Family, therefore, has always occupied 
the central space in the definition of Armenian women’s identity.15 These pre-Soviet 
identification elements have only been superficially changed during the Communist 
period, “[d]espite legal guarantees of gender equality, the socialist political system 
perpetuated oppressive traditions that treated childbearing and family duties as the 
primary focus of women’s concern”.16 These remarks are also particularly important 
in  the  light  of  our  analysis  of  Armenian  women’s  proneness  to  act  as  economic 
actors and entrepreneurs and also agents for change.17 
In the Armenian case, civil society promotion and democracy building managed to 
be mutually reinforced thanks to the involvement of active women in this process. 
This interpretation challenges an academic trend depicting women in developing 
countries as passive actors embedded in cultural schemes which impede their full 
capacity  of  action.18  Although  it  would  not  be  accurate  to  talk  about  a  proper 
feminist movement in Armenia – indeed feminism is widely considered as a disruptive 
force which would not bring substantial benefits to the society19 – Armenian women 
did start to act as agents of change through their active involvement in NGOs and 
civil  society  organisations.  In  particular,  affiliation  to  or  membership  of  NGOs 
constitutes a tool to build societal trust in comparison with the traditional and, in the 
Armenian case, very strong kinship and family ties. It is therefore noticed that despite 
                                                           
14  A.  Ishkanian,  “En-gendering  Civil  Society  and  Democracy-Building:  The  Anti-Domestic 
Violence Campaign in Armenia”, Advancement of Socio-Economics, Winter 2007, p. 494. 
15 Ibid. 
16 A. Hrycak, “Coping with Chaos: Gender and Politics in a Fragmented State”, Problems of 
Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 5, September/October 2005, p. 70. 
17 Ishkanian, op.cit., pp. 484-485. 
18 Ibid. 
19 As a matter of fact UNICEF also acknowledges a certain “allergy to feminism” in transitional 
countries,  notwithstanding  the  increasing  advocacy  for  women’s  equality.  UNICEF-ICDC, 
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the  economic  and  political  setbacks  produced  by  the  transition  to  post-Soviet 
arrangements, women have found channels to take a more active stance in the 
country’s social life. However, what is still to be discussed is to what extent women’s 
participation as economic and political actors has increased and whether or not the 
EU’s SFP has played a role in this process of change.  
 
EU Action towards Armenian Women Empowerment 
Why has the EU included gender-focused actions in its foreign policy, and above all, 
has this commitment proved to be effective? 
The  main  rationale  pushing  for  inclusion  of  women  in  the  economic  activities  is 
obviously  the  positive  effect  on  economic  growth.  There  is  a  positive  correlation 
between these two dimensions, given that economic growth creates new jobs which 
can be filled by women, which in turn sustain the economy.20 Women empowerment 
is  therefore  instrumentally  and  normatively  desirable.  On  the  one  hand,  it  allows 
women to fully participate in the economic development and growth of a country, 
contributing directly to the improvement of long-term living conditions. On the other 
hand, it allows women to fully and freely enjoy their potentialities as subjects entitled 
to rights and duties, therefore increasing their awareness as individuals, women and 
active  citizens.  Drawing  on  this  assumption,  the  EU’s  foreign  policy  towards  third 
actors might be adequately described as ‘structural’ insofar as it manages to foster 
change that spills over on other relevant sectors and levels. Thus women assume a 
very relevant role in the eyes of the EU as actors capable of bettering democracy 
and strengthening human rights through their more active participation as citizens, 
workers and entrepreneurs.  
The main policy instruments, that the EU has to push forward projects with a clear 
gender dimension, are the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR)  and  the  Development  and  Cooperation  Instrument  (DCI).  Both  policy 
instruments  include  specific  reference  to  gender  issues,  assisting  the  ENPI  in  the 
implementation  of  the  ENP’s  Action  Plans.21  The  EIDHR  addresses  women’s  rights’ 
protection  as  a  component  of  the  promotion  of  human  rights  and  democracy, 
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preliminary  longitudinal  evaluation”,  Employment  Paper,  Geneva,  Employment  Sector, 
International Labour Office - ILO, 2003/45.  
21 Under the ENPI for the period 2007 - 2010, €98.4 million were granted solely to Armenia. 
Aslanyan, “A Gender Analysis of the European Union Development Aid in Armenia”, EU-CIS 
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whereas  the  DCI  operates  through  thematic  programmes. In  the  case  of  gender 
equality,  the  programme  ‘Investing  in  People’  is  the  main  action  framework.  The 
most important feature of  these two instruments is that they operate through civil 
society organisations without the involvement, or the agreement, of third countries’ 
governments,  thus  retaining  more  steering  space  for  manoeuvring  on  project 
planning and implementation.  
The implementation phase usually poses the most serious challenges to the whole 
project’s feasibility. Focusing on ‘Investing in People’, we actually see that the EU has 
adopted  a  ‘structural  approach’  in  its  formulation  because  it  aims  at  developing 
projects  at  ‘macro  level’  (women’s  economic  empowerment),  ‘meso  level’ 
(strengthening capacity of local self-government – LSG – to protect women’s rights) 
and  ‘micro  level’  (gender-sensitive  initiatives).  At  the  identification  stage,  that  is 
when the EU delegation selects the projects which will receive the grants according 
to  ‘evaluation  criteria’  (e.g.  relevance  of  the  action  with  regard  to  a  country’s 
needs, coherent project planning), the inclusion of gender is both rewarded and 
monitored. In the first case, women’s participation and involvement is considered as 
the added-value of the project and therefore it allows to score five points for the 
relevant  subheading.  Moreover,  every  project  should  pass  the  Gender  Equality 
Screening Checklist (GESCi), whose task is in fact to screen gender equality issues in 
the identification phase.  
In concrete terms, project implementation starts in the EU Delegations which rely on 
first-hand  information  to  define  priorities  and  benchmarks.  They  decide  whom  to 
award  the  grants  to  on  the  basis  of  their  contextual  knowledge  and  their  local 
human resources and networks. Some of the main rationale behind the choice of a 
given project is the non-overlapping with projects already on the ground and the 
principle  of  ‘covering  the  gaps’,  namely  tackling  those  aspects  which  have  not 
been  adequately  covered  by  other  sources  of  development  aid  or  by  the 
government. As DG DevCo suggests, the EU’s cooperation should not be involved in 
services provision but it should focus on actors, being governmental or societal, in 
order  to  build  up  stronger  capabilities  and  thus  ensure  results  of  long-term 
sustainability.22 This is particularly true for all those projects which aim at strengthening 
LSG  and  participatory  democracy,  where  gender  concerns  are  usually  included 
through a specific sentence which is always repeated because it allows to obtain 
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the highest score in the GESCi. Then, the chosen projects must go through the Quality 
Support Group (QSG), operating in the EU headquarters in Brussels, where checklists 
for  specific  standards  address  directly  the  inclusion  of  gender  in  the  projects’ 
planning,  like  in  the  case  of  the  Gender  Equality  Screening  Checklist  (GESCf) 
employed at the formulation stage.  
A realistic assessment is that the EU expects to obtain the highest level of effective-
ness  by  combining  gender  mainstreaming  and  specific  programmes.23  Besides 
enclosing gender equality in the official EU-Armenia  cooperation frameworks,  the 
support offered to women willing to start up a business or coping with initial difficulties 
are a clear evidence of the EU’s intentions to act on cognitive and social structures. 
The project, in analysis here, has in fact targeted women and operated in order to 
empower  them  in  these  areas  where  they  have  acknowledged  their  main 
shortcomings,  acting  through  specific  business-related  trainings,  access  to  credit, 
providing expertise to deal with administrative bodies, mentoring, organising business 
fairs  and  more  generally  speaking,  establishing  social  networks  for  female 
entrepreneurs.24  
However, it seems somehow unfeasible to produce permanent changes in social 
and mental structures in a 12-month time-span, despite the fact that changing the 
Armenian  society’s  perception  of  women’s  capability  to  do  business  is  the  main 
expected result.  Besides, measuring the impact of development projects on gender 
is a hard task in Armenia given the absence of research on the quality and efficiency 
of international aid.25  Albeit limited, the impact of the EU’s development projects 
should  not  be  underestimated.  The  women’s  increased  visibility  in  NGOs,  local 
governance  and  business  is  the  stepping  stone  to  shape  and  sustain  new 
perceptions about the role of women in society and to empower them as agents of 
change, both regarding men’s assumptions on gender roles and stereotypes and 
women’s  self-awareness and self-confidence.26  A concrete example is  the recent 
creation  of  ‘Women  Entrepreneurs  Network’,  acting  as  a p latform  for  building 
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19 April 2012. 
24 European Commission (EuropeAid - EIDHR), Project Document, Entrepreneurship as a Tool 
for Raising the Role of Women in Society, Brussels, 2010. 
25 Aslanyan, op.cit., p. 29. 
26  For  an  enlightening  report  on  strengthening  women’s  entrepreneurial  capabilities,  their 
personal  experiences  and  comments  see  EBRD,  BAS  Programme.  Armenia  and  Georgia, 
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women entrepreneurs’ social capital, linking women in business throughout Armenia 
and  providing  courses,  training  and  mentorship  programmes.27  This  initiative, 
together with a series of seminars on how to develop women’s entrepreneurial skills, 
has  become  more  frequent  in  recent  years  and  they  have  been  carried  out  by 
women-run NGOs.28 
 
Conclusions: Structural Changes in the Making 
This  essay  provided  an  outlook  on  how  the  EU’s  foreign  policy,  conceived  as 
structural foreign policy, includes gender in its formulation and implementation. The 
analysis  emphasised  two  dimensions  in  particular:    firstly,  whether  the  EU  has 
managed  to  mainstream  gender  in  its  cooperation  framework  towards  Armenia, 
both in  terms  of political commitment and  actual implementation;  and secondly, 
whether  its  action  can  be  already  gauged  as  effective  as  a  means  to  foster 
structural changes at individual, societal and institutional level.  
Our analysis shows that what the EU seems to do through its foreign policy towards 
Armenia  is  assisting  and  backing  up  on-going  processes,  rather  than  being  their 
initiator. The EU, within the ENP framework, acts much more as a ‘gap-filler’ rather 
than as a proper actor for change. Gender is taken into account in every phase of 
the  policy-making  cycle  through  the  practice  of  gender  mainstreaming.  Gender 
mainstreaming actually seems to offset the lack of explicit and direct commitment 
towards  more  concrete  and  gender-focused  actions,  thereby  running  the  risk  of 
diluting  gender  in  every  policy  area  without  coping  effectively  with  it.  Without 
denying its relevance as policy strategy to embed gender in the EU’s foreign policy, I 
argue that the EU should not solely rely on it if it really wants to have a deep impact 
on women’s situation in third countries. Gender mainstreaming is a rather powerful 
instrument insofar as the EU wants to prepare the ground for more targeted actions, 
but it is certainly not enough when conceived as the only instrument available to 
cope with gender issues.  
As regards the instruments used, the ENPI’s limitedness, in terms of financial resources 
employed  to  tackle  gender  issues,  shows  that  gender  is  by  no  means  the  main 
priority  in  the  EU-Armenia cooperation framework. Furthermore, reliance on extra-
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accessed 3 May 2012. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
42 
ENPI thematic policy instruments, such as the EIDHR and the DCI, does not help to 
single out gender as a priority for action within the ENP framework. A more effective 
EU policy would need to take further account of the national Armenian context and 
its peculiarities. Today, the identity of Armenian women is still strongly anchored in the 
ideas  of  motherhood  and  family.  This  cognitive  framework  should  be  primarily 
addressed in every gender-related EU policy formulation.  
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5.  EU Micro-Rule-of-Law Policies in Lebanon: Abiding by the Rules of the 
Sectarian Game? 
Tressia Hobeika  
 
Introduction 
Knocking  on  a  “House  of  Many  Mansions”1  is  no  simple  feat,  particularly  when  it 
comes to the consolidation of the rule of law (RoL) from below. Lebanon’s intricate 
socio-political system has  hitherto  presented  an  exceptionally challenging  environ-
ment  to  any  foreign  policy  actor  interested  in  sowing  the  seeds  of  democratic 
reforms.  And  the  European  Union  is  no  exception.  Against  this  backdrop,  and 
considering the recent trend to analyse the EU foreign policy conundrum, particularly 
in the midst of the upheavals on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, this essay 
takes a step back by delving into EU policies in Lebanon, the once most ‘democratic’ 
yet fragile state in the region.2 More specifically, it deals with the extent to which EU 
micro-policies3 in Lebanon shape sustainable rule-of-law structures. I argue that EU 
micro-assistance4 to the RoL in Lebanon, instead of shaping sustainable rule-of-law 
structures, paradoxically runs the risk of reinforcing the status  quo  of  unsustainable 
structures, thereby indirectly abiding by the local rules of the sectarian game. 
 
Methodology and Conceptual Framework 
Albeit the EU frequently resorts to the rule-of-law concept in its policy documents and 
discourses,  there  is  little  consensus  on  its  general  definition  and  overarching 
significance,  thereby  making  it  “an  essentially  contested  concept”.5  Given  this 
prominent uncertainty about the rule-of-law bedrock, the basic rationale of the rule-
of-law assistance cannot but have the same fate. Even more, the rule-of-law term has 
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Routledge, 2011, p. 119. 
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through civil society, or the so-called “legal empowerment”. S. Golub,“Beyond Rule of Law 
Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative”, Carnegie Papers, no. 41, 2003. 
4  In  the  following,  I  use  the  term  RoL  ‘assistance’,  ‘support’  or  ‘strengthening’  and  not 
‘promotion’  given  that  the  latter  implies  a  Western  or  international  expert  perspective  of 
transplanting the RoL in a developing country without taking into account the local context. 
This remark is particularly coherent with the outside-in approach of this study.  
5  J.  Waldron,  “Is  the  Rule  of  Law  an  Essentially  Contested  Concept  (in  Florida)”,  Law  & 
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been  increasingly  present  in  the  Union’s  jargon  without,  however,  disposing  of  a 
“unitary rule-of-law model on offer”.6 In this context, in order to capture the entire 
range of EU micro-rule-of-law development programmes on offer, it would be fitting 
to adopt a comprehensive definition whereby RoL assistance can be channelled in a 
top-down  or  bottom-up  fashion,  in  other  terms,  in  a  state-centred  traditional  or 
grassroots legal empowerment approach.7 Having laid this all-inclusive definition, this 
study embraces a refined legal empowerment focus, given that the typical Western 
conception  of  civil  society  is  definitely  ill-suited  for  understanding  the  inherent 
dynamics of the state-society relations in a non-Western context like the Lebanese 
one. 
It follows that Jamal’s theory of democratic citizenship offers an adequate means to 
adapt the said definition of the rule of law, whereby “civic associations can serve as 
monitors  or  counterweights  to  the  state  [depending]  on  the  [overall  political] 
context”.8 According to Jamal, it is the same context that hinders or not some forms 
of  participation  and  shapes  one’s  attitudes  and  beliefs  about  political  and  civic 
participation.9  Integrating  Jamal’s  theory  in  the  legal  empowerment  approach 
therefore leads to a persuasive theoretical framework because it forces the study to 
“examine the reality of the situation on the ground”,10 particularly the inherent state-
society relations and the way associational activities are mediated.  
In a similar vein, this study is specifically sensitive to an outside-in approach, which 
loads the dice heavily in favour of the “contextual differences and realities of the 
target country”,11 beyond the inward-looking approach of “EU navel-gazing”.12 This 
approach is also apt to shed light on the limitations of attempting to transplant legal 
norms and institutions to a target country, which also corroborates the usefulness of 
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Chaillot Papers, no. 126, 2011, p. 153. 
7  The  rule-of-law  orthodoxy  implies  that  a  state-centred  approach  is  undertaken  whereby 
rule-of-law oriented projects are designed and implemented in cooperation with high-rank 
governmental  officials.  In  contrast  hereto,  the  more  balanced  legal  empowerment 
approach, which goes beyond the rule-of-law orthodoxy, is grounded in grassroots needs 
through, inter alia, an emphasis on fostering civil society, its role and capacities, as well as its 
partnership with the state. Golub, op.cit. 
8 A. Jamal, Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab 
World, New Jersey & Oxfordshire, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 9. 
9 Ibid., p.10. 
10 Cavatorta & Durac, op.cit., p. 30. 
11 S. Keukeleire, “Structural Foreign Policy”, 2013, (forthcoming), p.15. 
12 S. Keukeleire, “Pitfalls in analysing (EU) Foreign Policy”, Paper presented at the Workshop 6 
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scrutinising the EU legal empowerment approach in its above adaptation. Above all, 
taking an outside-in approach is seminal for the detection of ‘hidden’ or ‘neglected’ 
dimensions  of  foreign  policy,  a  common  pitfall  in  the  analysis  of  European  foreign 
policy.13  
It  is  therefore  against  the  above  theoretical  backcloth  that  Keukeleire’s  structural 
foreign  policy  (SFP)  remains the most cogent conceptual framework, chosen as a 
vehicle for analysis in this essay, since it clearly encapsulates these same neglected 
dimensions in a way to shape or influence sustainable structures in various sectors, 
levels and mind-sets, the RoL in Lebanon in our case. Accordingly, Figure 1 reflects the 
adaptation of Keukeleire’s original framework.  
Figure 1: SFP Structures 
 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
Influencing  or  shaping  sustainable  structures  ultimately  means  that  one  (or  more) 
level(s),  sector(s)  and  mind-set(s)/mental  structure(s)  should  be  targeted  by  the 
external  foreign  policy  actor,  the  EU  in  our  study.  In  this  framework,  comprehen-
siveness is a conditio sine qua non  for the achievement of sustainable results. This 
consequently requires a cognitive effort to discern the interconnectedness between 
the relevant sectors and levels. Structure relevance is accordingly depicted in Figure 
1,  thus  facilitating  the  visualisation  of  the  3D  structures:  the  more  relevant  the 
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sector/level/mind-set, the closer to the origin of the structures-graph it is placed for 
the  case  at  hand.  More  specifically,  a  foreign  policy  actor  should  make  sure  to 
influence the right sector(s), the right level(s) and the right mental structure(s) for a 
successful internalisation and viability of the structural change to be induced. 
Identifying the structures to be targeted in a recipient-country should therefore be 
included as a preliminary and first stage of the policy-making and policy-evaluation 
cycle of the original framework (see Introduction). And this is no simple feat. This step 
perforce  requires  a  great  understanding  of  the  country,  its  history,  language(s), 
culture, and all other intricacies. The second stage undertakes a textual and discourse 
analysis  of  EU p olicy  documents  of  legal  and  political  nature,  that  is,  of  its  policy 
objectives, in search for a potential discrepancy between rhetoric and commitment. 
This, therefore, allows the detection of the EU’s intentions behind the neglect of a 
number  of  structures,  in  other  terms,  the  hidden  (unintentionally)  or  neglected 
(intentionally) structures. The third stage of analysis, in turn, juxtaposes these afore-
mentioned  policy  objectives  against  reality,  by  scrutinising  their  translation  into  a 
tangible  policy  output,  in  other  terms,  into  “concrete  operational  measures  and 
decisions”.14 Whereas this analytical step specifically deals with policy output at the 
EU level, the fourth stage delves into the actual policy implementation in the local 
context, in a way to unpack the policy objectives and outputs and expose them to 
empirical scrutiny. 
 
The Local Context: A ‘House of Many Mansions’ 
In “strong societies and weak states”15 like Lebanon, “citizens have no opportunity for 
representation outside the confines of their sect”,16 therefore leading to a practically 
inexistent  “institutionalised citizen-state relationship”.17  Indeed,  the  most  compelling 
literature in Lebanon has made clear that sectarianism has long permeated every 
aspect of the political, civil and social life of the Lebanese. 18 
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no. 64, 2006, p. 3. 
17 Ibid. 
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Whereas the Ottoman Empire and the French mandate played a vital role in turning it 
into an umbilical cord, it was the National Pact of 1943 – Al-Mithaq Al-Watani – that 
“legally confessionalised”19 the state-society relationship, thus placing it under the grip 
of a strong sectarian ruling cartel. The end of the devastating civil war (1975-1990) 
would  not  circumvent  the  confessional  grip  over  this  peculiar  relationship.  Rather, 
another fifteen-year-long Syrian occupation wrecked the little legitimacy left in the 
state institutions, hence exacerbating all facets of sectarianism, by sidestepping any 
sort of national reconciliation and undertaking a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy of all 
political and ethno-religious factions. 
In the meantime, the post-war “confessional oligarchy”20 or zuama, backed by heads 
of  confession,  had  moved  the  bloody  civil  war  to  the  political  sphere,  as  true 
“unaccountable gatekeepers”21  hijacking “the relationship between the state and 
‘its’ citizens, not only in practice but through the law as well”.22 The 2005 Syrian with-
drawal  from  Lebanese  territories  and  politics  engendered  “a  political  game  of 
musical chairs”23 in which each ruling leader successfully sought a fair piece of the 
sectarian pie. 
With this historical premise in mind, it is worth recalling that sectarianism in Lebanon is 
of  political,  civil  and  social  nature.  Whereas  political  sectarianism  refers  to  the 
‘confessionalisation’ of the state’s institutions captured by the sectarian cartel, civil 
sectarianism represents the communitarisation of the citizens’ personal status leading 
to  a  hegemonic  patriarchal  coalition  between  the  ruling  elite  and  the  heads  of 
confessions.24  Finally,  social  sectarianism  is  a  logical  result  of  the  above  types  of 
sectarianism, stemming from the “absence of shared beliefs about the appropriate 
boundaries of the state”,25 a typical aspect of divided societies. And while the state 
remains practically absent from the citizens’ realities, they tend to find refuge in their 
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South Africa, London, Routledge, 2010, p. 5. 
22 UNDP, op.cit., p.26. 
23 J. Choucair Vizoso, “How serious is the EU about supporting democracy and human rights in 
Lebanon?”,  ECFR-FRIDE  Working  Paper,  London  &  Madrid,  European  Council  on  Foreign 
Relations and FRIDE, 2008, p. 1. 
24  All  personal  or  family  matters  such  as  divorce,  affiliation  and  succession  fall  under  the 
‘personal status law’ whereby each of the 18 religious communities has its own family law and 
religious court. 
25  B.  Weingast,  “Democratic  Stability  as  a S elf-Enforcing  Equilibrium”,  in  A.  Breton,  Under-
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own  confessions,  hence  strengthening  the  legitimacy  of  their  sectarian  leaders. 
However,  it  is  the  same  obstinacy  of  the  sectarian  arrangements  in  place  that 
paradoxically gives leeway for a certain degree of liberalism, expressed through a 
complex landscape of civil society organisations (CSOs).26 One way to apprehend 
the latter is related to the their ‘locus’ on the state-society relationship, that is, their 
relative ties with the ruling cartel and their dependence on patron-client networks, 
whether sectarian or secular. 
In essence, the inherent dynamics of the Lebanese socio-political system has led to a 
schism in associational life. At one end of the spectrum, some associations abide by 
the rules of the sectarian game, in an accommodating approach, and use patron-
age networks in order to fulfil their mandates, thus reinforcing the grip of sectarian 
leaders over their constituencies. At the other end of the spectrum, some other CSOs 
–  usually  secular  in  nature  –  adopt  a  more  confrontational  approach,  although 
hampered by the elite and their religious allies. In the middle of the spectrum are 
those organisations that adopt a pragmatic approach with the leaders while doing 
their best to advance their agendas. Ultimately, albeit vibrant and numerous, CSOs in 
Lebanon  cannot  be  detached  from  their  socio-political  context.  As  Jamal  rightly 
pointed out, “[t]he overall political context in which associations operate […] shapes 
the way in which associations may or may not produce democratic change”.27 In this 
context, CSOs’ engagement hinges on their locus in the state-citizen relationship and 
therefore its contribution to the consolidation of the rule of law. 
In an attempt to heuristically probe EU policies in Lebanon towards the consolidation 
of the RoL from within, this essay builds, in the following part, on EU micro-rule-of-law 
programmes, AFKAR 1 and AFKAR 2, by casting light on the aforementioned stages of 
EU policy-making and policy evaluation cycles.28  
 
Stage 1 – Know Thy Structures 
After a concise account of the local field, an SFP analysis in the first stage of its policy-
making cycle takes off with a scrutiny of the structures targeted by the foreign policy 
actor in question. In our case, EU micro-RoL policies through the AFKAR programmes 
                                                           
26 Cavatorta & Durac, op.cit., pp.119-120. 
27 Jamal, op.cit., p. 9. 
28 EU’s AFKAR programme is a €4 million grant which funded 40 NGOs (16 for AFKAR 1 and 24 
for AFKAR 2) in addition to 4 training sessions and 5 thematic exchanges.  Its main objective 
was the strengthening of the action of Lebanese civil society in favour of respect of civil and 
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explicitly target rule-of-law structures, being sector-based, level-based and/or mind-
set  based.  As  already  noted,  knowing  both  the  project-related  structures  and  the 
hidden/neglected  structures  is  seminal  for  the  viability  and  sustainability  of 
programmes in a recipient-country, as it can be seen in Figure 2.29 
Figure 2: Rule-of-Law Structures 
 
Source: compiled by the author. 
A closer look at the Y-axis or the level-axis reveals AFKAR’s objective to influence rule-
of-law structures at both state and societal levels: “a programme of partnership and 
dialogue between the Lebanese government [state level], the European Union, and 
the different organisations of the Lebanese civil society [societal level]”.30 However, 
by aiming at creating a partnership and dialogue between the government and the 
civil  society,  the  programme  fails  to  discern  –  whether  intentionally  or  not  –  the 
informal patron-client structures, these mafia-like structures that ostensibly trump the 
formal state structures. It also divulges a deeply embedded inside-out or EU/ropean 
perspective of the “concept of the civil society as a counter-power”31 combined with 
                                                           
29  The  more  relevant  the sector/level/mind-set  with  regards  to  the  project(s)  at  hand,  the 
closer it is to the origin of the structures-graph. This cognitive exercise, of course bundled with 
an  exhaustive  knowledge  of  the  field,  could  help  detect  the  hidden  or  intentionally 
neglected structures. 
30 The Lebanese government is represented by the Office of the Minister for Administrative 
Reform (OMSAR). Call for Proposals, EuropeAid/123756/M/ACT/LB. 
31 Call for Proposals, op.cit. 
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the assumption of a pattern of functional politics in Lebanon as well as a Western-like 
state-society relationship. 
The X-axis or sector-axis, in turn, displays the rule-of-law sectors to be influenced by the 
EU.  It  is  clear  that  AFKAR  targets  the  politico-legal  sectors  fulfilled  by  the  state 
institutions  and  the  social  sector  related  to  the  CSOs’  advocacy  and  awareness 
activities. However, ignoring – intentionally or not – the previously discussed politico-
civil sectarianism in Lebanon, or in SFP jargon, the politico-civil sectarian level, does 
render the analysis of EU rule-of-law micro-policies in Lebanon incomplete.32 
As for the Z-axis or the mind-set-axis, it gained a foothold in the analytical framework 
due to its pertinence to the study at hand. The more viably these mind-set-structures 
are  shaped,  the  more  internalised  is  the  organising  principle  (RoL)  along  with  its 
operationalisation. Given that “[s]tructures can be ‘layered’”,33 it follows that these 
mental structures buoy to the surface as an amalgam of sub-structures in the case of 
the EU’s AFKAR programmes. And the aforementioned social sectarianism is one of 
them  (Figure  2).  In  fact,  the  socio-sectarian  structure  or  sub-structure  is  deeply 
entrenched in the mental frameworks of citizens, in a country where “sectarianism is 
not an alternative to nationalism […but] essential to it”.34 Remarkably, EU micro-RoL 
programmes explicitly recognise the need to shape the socio-sectarian structure in 
their  stated  objectives  through,  for  example,  “national  reconciliation  and  inter-
communal dialogue” in AFKAR 1.35 However, the AFKAR-intended structural change 
cannot  be  viable  without  taking  into  account  what  Keukeleire  calls  the  “dual 
legitimacy factor”.36 Indeed, the internalisation of the structural sustainable change is 
more likely to occur when seen as legitimate by the recipient-citizens.37 Perceptions 
are therefore an “important factor in facilitating or opposing the achievement of EU-
                                                           
32 The economic sector could also be said to be missing, especially as some CSOs hamper 
the traditional patron-client channels due to their important network of service provisions, thus 
indirectly linking the rule of law with the socio-economic situation of Lebanese citizens.  
33 O. Waever, “Resisting the Temptation of Post Foreign Policy Analysis”, in W. Carlsnaes & S. 
Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London, 
Sage Publications, 1994. 
34 C. Härdig, “Finding Unity in Fragmentation. The Role of Civil Society in Factionalized Polity”, 
Paper presented at the 2008  Annual Meeting of the International Studies  Association, San 
Francisco, 26-29 March 2008, p. 24. 
35 Call for Proposals, op.cit. 
36 Keukeleire, “Structural Foreign Policy”, op.cit., p. 15. 
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sponsored  policies”.38  This  is  clearly  a  matter  of  the  EU’s  ‘soft  power’  in  Lebanon, 
which has been categorised by the Commission as a ‘willing’ neighbour in contrast to 
the  other  ‘hesitant’  ENP  countries,  in  terms  of  its  commitment  to  shared  political 
values.39  Accordingly,  Lebanon  is  ‘willing’  to  “see  a  strong  EU  involvement  in 
supporting [its] internal political transformation towards […] the rule of law”.40  
 
Stage 2 – The Paper-Policy Discourse 
The second level of SFP analysis is of paramount importance given that it delves into 
the “preparation, definition and adoption of the policy objectives”, by distinguishing 
between declaratory objectives and real intentions, in other terms, between sheer 
rhetoric and actual commitment. In that sense, it provides a glimpse of the intentions 
behind neglecting a number of ‘other’ rule-of-law structures, therefore giving fresh 
insight on the neglected dimensions of foreign policy. 
An  analysis  of  the  EU-Lebanon  formal  framework,41  or  a  policy-on-paper  analysis,  
reveals a flagrant inferiority of the rule-of-law clauses when compared with political 
dialogue,  democracy  and  human  rights  along  with  a  confirmation  of  the  afore-
mentioned conceptual inconsistency when it comes to the use of the RoL concept. 
What is nevertheless crystal-clear is the prevalence of the security component, such 
as in the 2003 European Security Strategy, which reads that: 
The  best  protection  for  our  security  is  a  world  of  well-governed  democratic 
states. […E]stablishing the rule of law […is] the best means of strengthening the 
international order.42 
‘Our  security’  clearly  implies  a  self-interested  strategy,  hence  EU  self-regarding 
interests. It also visibly infers to the profound link between RoL support and security 
goals  in  EU f oreign  policy,  in  other  terms,  between  “milieu  goals”  and  “possession 
                                                           
38 S. Lucarelli & L. Fioramonti, “Introduction: the EU in the eyes of the others – why bother?”, in 
S. Lucarelli & L. Fioramonti (eds.), External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global 
Actor, London, Routledge, p. 2. 
39 N. Tocci, “Can the EU Promote Democracy and Human Rights through the ENP? The Case 
for Refocusing on the Rule of Law”, Workshop at the European University Institute, Florence, 
December 2006, p.6. 
40 Ibid. This claim has also been confirmed by an EU-funded Opinion Polling and Research 
project, which showed that “Lebanese values are broadly in line with perceived values of the 
EU. “Perceptions of the EU in Lebanon: Evolving Attitudes 2009-2010”, ENPI Info Centre, 3 May 
2011. 
41 A wide array of EU policy instruments reflects EU micro-policies in Lebanon such as the EU-
Lebanon Association Agreement, the sole legal basis in the framework of the ENP or other 
formal documents, including the ENP-related documents. 
42 European Council, A secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 
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goals”.43 Using a SFP conceptual lens, this finding effectively corroborates the analysis 
of  structures  in  the  previous  stage  of  policy-making  cycle  and  draws  further 
conclusions, particularly when it comes to the politico-sectarian structures neglected 
by  the  EU-funded  programme  AFKAR.  In  fact,  by  favouring  its  possession  goals  of 
security over a real engagement with the neighbouring milieu, the EU has intentionally 
neglected the politico-sectarian structure, in a way to maintain the status quo and 
not put the stability of the region in jeopardy. Even though the EU has been criticised 
for  its  failure  to  discern  the  hidden  politico-sectarian  structure  due  to  its  “limited 
understanding  of  the  political  dynamics”,44  the  above  scrutiny  clearly  denotes  an 
intentional trumping of a real milieu transformation by a mere possession goal. In a 
similar vein, this clearly swings the pendulum in the direction of a conventional foreign 
policy, hence entailing a low degree of EU SFP in Lebanon. 
In contrast, a policy-in-discourse analysis reveals an abundance of lofty declarations 
in Brussels about the EU’s commitment to the RoL consolidation in Lebanon and its 
concerns over democratisation.45 However, when it usually came to serious political or 
sectarian  gridlocks  in  Beirut,  the  EU  merely  ignored  all  previous  declarations  and 
adopted  a  non-confrontational  approach  with  regards  to  the  politico-sectarian 
structure. 
In a nutshell, whereas policy documents and agreements clearly loaded the dice in 
favour of a conventional foreign policy, officials in Brussels exhibited more engage-
ment with the milieu transformation, thus reflecting a certain paper-discourse gap. 
This was seminal for the detection of the EU intentional neglect of the politico-civil 
sectarian structures in Lebanon. 
 
   
                                                           
43 Milieu goals aim at “transforming the environment […by reinforcing inter alia] the rule of 
law”  whereas  possession  goals  rely  on  certain  degree  of  cooperation  with  status  quo 
structures in the recipient country with the view of protecting EU’s interests. Tocci, op.cit., p. 
10; A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962, pp. 73-76. 
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45 See S. Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, 
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Stage 3 – From Words to Deeds 
This third stage delves into the EU-policy output level, inter alia, AFKAR’s stakeholders 
and application process.46  
Figure 3: Policy Output and Implementation Levels 
 
Source: compiled by the author. 
A preliminary note starts off with a remark on the aforementioned AFKAR-intended 
“partnership and dialogue” between the Lebanese stakeholders (Figure 3).47 At first 
sight, this partnership seems to be designed to “support [Lebanon’s] own reforms”48 
instead of transposing the EU’s own structures. In SFP language, engaging with ‘other 
governmental  actors’  (in  our  case,  OMSAR  see  infra)  and  ‘non-state  actors’  while 
‘proactively’ respecting their own dynamics are basically ‘other dimensions of foreign 
policy’, and somehow characteristics of a SFP.49 However, a closer look at the actors’ 
profiles and interactions suggests quite different conclusions. In fact, this ‘partnership’ 
was described in the academic scholarship as a state-centred approach resulting in 
the EU’s “reluctance to demand genuine political reforms […] while making sure not 
to bypass state authorities even if this clearly diminished the value of democratisation 
on offer”.50 To put it more bluntly, the EU seems to have lowered its chances of imple-
menting its objectives by “driving the principle of non-interference in […Lebanon’s] 
                                                           
46 A detailed analysis of the AFKAR-related policy outputs (rationale, stakeholders, budget, 
institutional  set-up)  can  be  found  in:  T.  Hobeika,  EU  micro-rule-of-law  policies  in  Lebanon: 
abiding by the rules of the sectarian game?, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2012. 
47 See stage 1. 
48 B. Ferrero-Waldner, “The Middle East in the EU’s External Relations”, speech, ‘Madrid: Fifteen 
Years Later’ Conference, Madrid, 11 January 2007. 
49 Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, op.cit., p. 20. 
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political affairs to the extreme”.51 This definitely corroborates the non-confrontational 
approach previously detected in the discourse of European officials in Brussels.  
The choice of the Office of the Minister for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) as the EU’s 
contracting  authority  is  also  revealing.  Since  its  inception  in  1993,  OMSAR  has 
constantly received UNDP assistance, in terms of financial, personnel and technical 
support, which makes its staff the most qualified when compared to civil servants in 
other  more  corrupt  Ministries.52  OMSAR  is  not  a M inistry  but  rather a  mere  support 
office  of  the  Minister  of  State,  and  therefore  lacks  the  prerogatives  to  implement 
serious  reforms.  This  perforce  casts  doubts  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  so-called 
‘partnership’ claimed by AFKAR. Recalling AFKAR’s objectives to foster the RoL, the 
choice  of  OMSAR  as  a p artner,  albeit  the  best  option  for  a  short-term  painless 
implementation  of  EU’s  micro-policies,  could  somehow  undermine  the  claims  of  a 
long-term sustainable impact of a SFP. 
Another element of the level-one-level-two analysis in Figure 3 could be the applica-
tion process, as a quick look at the programmes’ Calls for Proposals and their annexes 
reveals a lengthy application form with a strict format and rigid conclusions, beyond 
the expertise and scope of smaller CSOs. Applying for EU funds is so complicated that 
many  CSOs  have  resorted  to  local  ‘EU  grants  experts’  to  draft  the  proposals  for 
them.53 In fact, many civil society activists in Lebanon complain that the EU “pick[s] its 
beneficiaries  from  a very  small pool  of  NGOs  […due  to]  the  highly  formalistic  and 
complicated  application  procedures  designed  to  secure  fair  bidding  for  projects 
defined by pre-conceived needs”.54 Would the EU not be unintentionally financing 
NGOs  with  other  sources  of  funds,  that  is,  from  the  aforementioned  patron-client 
channels? This also implies that many effective CSOs with substantial constituencies 
but lacking know-how of the compulsory technical jargon in English or French cannot 
make it through the selection procedure. This definitely swings the pendulum away 
from a SFP.  
 
Stage 4 – Separate the Sheep from the Goats 
This  stage  of  the  policy-making  cycle represents  the  actual policy  implementation 
phase dealing with the dynamics between level-two and level-three actors in Figure 
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3. It is worth mentioning that very little empirical research has hitherto assessed the 
implementation of EU programmes on the ground, in a way to juxtapose rhetoric and 
objectives-on-paper against reality. In this respect, this empirical scrutiny is vital for the 
detection  of  further  inconsistencies  and  perhaps  the  limitations  of  EU  micro-RoL 
programmes even when genuinely and transparently implemented. 
Level-two-implementation  is  mainly  concerned  with  extra-EU  actors,  such  as  the 
OMSAR,  the  Contracting  Authority  entrusted  with  the  implementation  of  the 
programme.  55 A closer look at the evaluation and selection process, for example, 
reveals that a local selection committee was “appointed by OMSAR and approved 
by  the  European  Commission  (observer)”  with  the  assistance  of  an  international 
expert in the case of AFKAR 2.56 This screening process has been heavily criticised 
given that state representatives in the local committee were selected according to 
sectarian affiliation, thereby “raising serious questions about the non-governmental or 
political impartial nature of the winners”.57  
In fact, stringent EU rules forbidding personal contacts with the applicants implied that 
EU officials failed to “explore the field themselves” and therefore to recognise that 
some  of  these  CSOs  in  reality  served  as  a  vehicle  for  the  zuama’s  political 
advancement.58 Using an SFP lens, this clearly indicates that the EU has unintentionally 
neglected  the  hidden  patron-client  rule-of-law  structure  and  eventually  reinforced 
the grip of sectarian leaders on the state-society relation or the much-touted AFKAR 
‘partnership’ between the Lebanese government and CSOs. This also suggests that 
even more ‘potential applicants’ were punished for their mere locus on the state-
society relationship spectrum. A possible reason behind this neglect of structure could 
be  the  adoption  of  an  inward-looking  narrow  definition  of  civil  society,  often 
considered  as  the  “sand in  the  wheels  of [a] political process”,59  therefore  clearly 
lacking  a  complete  understanding  of  the  inherent  dynamics  in  the  local  context. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the main innovation behind AFKAR is mainly the 
fact that it moves EU micro-policies in Lebanon beyond ready-made suggestions that 
simply disrupt or obscure the local context. Instead, it does compel CSOs to look for 
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‘implementation of the action’ by the beneficiaries. 
56 Call for Proposals, op.cit. 
57 Goes & Leenders, op.cit., p. 102. 
58 Ibid., pp. 103-104. 
59  P.  Grajzl  &  P.  Murrell,  “Fostering  Civil  Society  to  Build  Institutions:  Why  and  When”, Draft 
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creative solutions for their environment. However, a crucial question remains: which 
CSOs  have  been  funded  by  the  EU  in  a  way  to  translate  its  micro-RoL  policies  in 
Lebanon, or better said, to influence the flawed rule-of-law structures?  
Table 1 shows 14 of the 40 AFKAR-funded CSOs (level-three-implementation). A first 
look  detects  one  sectarian  organisation,  the  René  Moawad  Foundation  (RMF), 
established by René Moawad’s Maronite wife two years after his assassination, as a 
tribute  to  him.60  Turning  to  the  National Committee for the Follow-up  on  Women’s 
Issues (NCFUWI), it has been described as an ‘elitist organisation’ that saw the light in 
the wake of Lebanon’s preparation of the Beijing Convention, as a shadow NGO for 
the National Commission for the Lebanese Woman Affairs, a semi-official body of the 
state. The elite monopolisation of this organisation has indeed avoided addressing 
gender-based  issues  that  could  put  the  hegemony  of  the  sectarian  ruling  elite  in 
jeopardy,61 thus displaying a blatant accommodating approach with them. 
Detecting sectarian threads in associations enables greater insights into the hitherto 
drawn conclusions. In fact, by distancing its officials from the bidding process, the EU 
has unintentionally allowed parasite-CSOs to plague its programme, thus preventing it 
from influencing the patron-client structures. Arguably, by funding these associations, 
the EU has diverted its money from the right recipients to associations that already 
enjoy abundant funding. Moving slowly towards the other end of the state-society 
relationship, another type of CSOs appears on the way. KAFA, for example, has acted 
as  a  leading  association  in  the  drafting  of the  domestic violence  bill, in  a  certain 
pragmatic approach, in a way that it is “better off with the ruling cartel rather than 
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Lebanon, Master’s thesis, Beirut, Lebanese American University, 2010. Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
57 
Table 1: AFKAR Rule-of-Law Funded CSOs 
Programme  Advocacy Actions  Awareness Actions 
AFKAR 1  Lebanese Association for 
Democratic Elections (LADE) 
Youth Association for Social 
Awareness (YASA) 
  René Moawad Foundation (RMF)  Association for Volunteer Services 
(AVS) 
  National Committee for the Follow-
Up of Women Issues (NCFUWI) 
 
AFKAR 2  National Committee for the Follow-
Up of Women Issues (NCFUWI) 
Forum des Handicapés au Liban 
Nord (FOH) 
  Lebanese Council to Resist Violence 
Against Women (LCORVAW) 
RESTART 
  SKOUN  T.E.R.R.E. LIBAN 
  Centre d’Étude Stratégiques pour le 
Moyen Orient  (CESMO) 
Lebanese Autism Association (LAS) 
  Lebanese Association for 
Democratic Elections (LADE) 
Association pour la Défense des 
Droits et des Libertés (ADDL) 
  KAFA  Institute for Development 
Research, Advocacy and Applied 
Care (IDRAAC) 
  MAHARAT  Centre for Development & 
Planning (CDP) 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
Conclusion 
To  what  extent  do  EU  micro-policies  in  Lebanon  shape  sustainable  rule-of-law 
structures? After a thorough analysis, it would be fair to say that the foreign policy 
pendulum has swung in both directions of the continuum throughout the four-staged-
analysis,  with  nevertheless  a  lopsided  orientation  towards  the  characteristics  and 
dimensions of a conventional foreign policy. Put simply, EU micro-policies in Lebanon 
paradoxically run the risk of reinforcing status quo rigid and unsustainable rule-of-law 
structures, instead of sustainably shaping them, thereby indirectly complying with the 
rules of the Lebanese sectarian game.  
While coming up with new rules for a secular non-sectarian game cannot be done 
overnight, any step towards altering any of the existing deep-seated rules would be 
significant. Making the sectarian game less of a zero-sum game through its micro-
policies takes off with a more thorough knowledge of the field and a more proactive 
approach with its Lebanese partners. The EU does enjoy a cross-sectarian credibility Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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and  legitimacy  in  Lebanon  that  no  other  foreign  policy  actor  has.  It  follows  that 
lending more financial weight to shaping the mental structures, through continuous 
micro-support to cross-confessional engagement would definitely make a difference 
on the long run. Yet, this micro-assistance should be thought more strategically. As a 
first step, meddling into Lebanese internal political affairs at the micro-level would not 
only do no harm, but would also help EU officials separate the sheep from the goats 
when  funding  civil  society  organisations.  On  another  level,  engaging  with  more 
relevant but corrupt state actors, even though detrimental to the short-term success 
of its programmes, could be of paramount importance for a long-term consolidation 
of the rule of law. 
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When applying the structural foreign policy (SFP) framework – whether in order to 
develop or to analyse a policy – one must confront a series of questions about what 
SFP is and how it should be used. I had to grapple with these questions when testing 
the  capacity  of  the  framework  to  explain  the  EU’s  performance  in  promoting 
economic  reform  in  Egypt  through  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy.1  In  this 
essay, I will set out some of the issues I considered and some of the conclusions I 
came to about the framework’s strengths and weaknesses. The first area that I will 
deal with here relates to whether the SFP framework should be used normatively or 
analytically. Secondly, this essay will address some general issues surrounding SFP’s 
potential  as  a t heoretical  model  and  a p olicy-maker’s  paradigm,  which  can  be 
questioned in terms of its parsimony, its comprehensiveness, and its generalisability. 
Thirdly, some more specific issues relating to how the SFP framework can be applied 
by students, researchers and practitioners will be explored: its division into sectors 
and  levels,  its  splitting  up  of  the  policy  process  into  four  distinct  phases,  and  its 
emphasis  on  internalisation  and  sustainability  each  have  varied  impacts  on  the 
framework’s usefulness. 
 
Normative or Analytical – How Should the SFP Framework Be Used? 
Keukeleire  presents  the  SFP  concept  as  an  ‘analytical  framework’,  inviting 
researchers and students to examine a foreign policy against the SFP framework to 
establish whether it qualifies as ‘structural’.2 Following this approach, students can, 
for example, test whether a particular EU foreign policy is a SFP by adapting the SFP 
framework to the relevant policy area and local context and analysing the extent to 
which  this  policy  addresses  the  sectors  and  levels  identified  in  the  adapted 
framework. By using the SFP framework in such a way, students might also hope to 
draw  our  attention  to  often-neglected  aspects  of  foreign  policy  action  and 
implementation, and to reveal unexpected links between different sectors and levels 
of the policy context. However interesting these outcomes of a purely analytical use 
                                                           
1 C.  Naylor, EU Promotion of Trade Reform in Egypt: A Structural Foreign Policy Approach, 
Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2012. 
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of  the  framework  might  be,  the  principal  finding  of  such  an  application  of  the 
framework will always be an answer to a ‘Is policy X structural?’ research question. 
The significance of any such conclusion is, however, limited if no further meaning is 
attached to it: as long as the conclusion ‘this policy is/is not a SFP’ means no more 
than ‘this policy has fulfilled the criteria of (an adapted version of) Keukeleire’s SFP 
framework’, we can legitimately ask why we should care.  
If  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  a  purely  analytical  application  of  the  SFP 
framework are of limited value, we might consider whether it is possible to add a 
normative dimension to the application of the framework, whereby the degree to 
which a policy fulfils the criteria set out in a SFP framework (adapted to the specific 
context of the policy under examination) is used as a way to explain the policy’s 
performance.  There  is  some  tentative  encouragement  for  such  an  application  in 
Keukeleire’s  own  presentation  of  the  concept,  in  which  he  hints  at  its  normative 
potential.  For  example,  he  presents  SFP  in  terms  of  improving  the  legitimacy, 
effectiveness and sustainability of foreign policy action, implying that an SFP delivers 
better  results in the long-term  than  other  types  of  foreign  policy.3 If  the extent  to 
which a foreign policy is structural – the extent to which it addresses the sectors and 
levels set out in an adapted SFP framework – can explain the extent to which that 
policy is successful, the SFP framework might be used by researchers and students to 
predict  and  explain  the  performance  of  foreign  policies  and  by  practitioners  to 
design foreign policies.  
This  ‘normative’  application  of  the  SFP  framework  is  both  considerably  more 
ambitious  and,  potentially,  considerably  more  meaningful  than  the  analytical 
approach described above. However, it is, at present, unjustifiable: in order to be 
able to use the SFP framework in such a way, its explanatory capacity first needs to 
be proven. If it is shown that structural foreign policies are successful foreign policies, 
then  the  framework  can  be  used  in  this  normative  way.  Students  might  consider 
testing SFP’s explanatory capacity by applying an adapted SFP framework to an EU 
foreign  policy  and  assessing  the  extent  to  which  it  helps  to  explain  that  policy’s 
performance.  Students’  case  studies  could  form  part  of  a  body  of  evidence  to 
support  a f uture  normative  application  of  the  SFP  framework,  either  in  policy 
development or policy analysis. Two criteria against which the framework’s explana-
tory  value  might  be  judged  are  its  comprehensiveness  –  the  extent  to  which  it 
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explains  performance  –  and  its  parsimony  –  the  extent  to  which  it  does  so  in  an 
efficient, practicable manner. Some preliminary conclusions about the SFP frame-
work’s fulfilment of these criteria will be explored below.  
 
The Framework’s Potential as a Theoretical Model and a Policy-Maker’s Paradigm 
Several of the SFP framework’s weaknesses are relevant regardless of whether it is 
used analytically or normatively, while others relate only to a normative application. 
The first issue is that in order to operationalise the SFP framework, as will be demon-
strated in preceding essays, it must be adapted into case-specific frameworks based 
on certain research-based assumptions about the relevance of different sectors and 
levels  to  a  particular  policy  in  a  particular  context.  This  sort  of  adaptation  of  the 
framework, evident in all of this paper’s case studies, is necessary if it is to be relevant 
to the context to which it is being applied – a SFP looking to improve gender equality 
in Armenia will clearly have to deal with different sectors and levels compared to a 
SFP seeking to address corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
This adaptation does, however, have several effects that are detrimental to the SFP 
framework’s analytical and explanatory value. Firstly, it harms the parsimony of the 
model,  which,  as  preceding  essays  in  this  publication  show,  needs  significant 
adaptation to make it ready for use in any given context. Secondly, the necessity of 
this secondary stage effectively means that the SFP framework is not generalisable; it 
is in fact an umbrella for an as-yet-undeveloped group of case-specific frameworks. 
While many theories in the social sciences require small adaptations before they can 
be applied to a given phenomenon, the nature of the SFP framework – its emphasis 
on comprehensiveness and sensitivity to context – makes this adaptation particularly 
arduous  and  difficult  to  replicate.  This  reduces  the  explanatory  and  analytical 
capacity of the SFP framework per se – it needs to be significantly adapted, to the 
extent that it effectively becomes a new framework before it can tell us anything 
about a policy.  
Thirdly,  this  secondary  stage  of  context-specific  model  refinement  makes  it  very 
difficult to test the validity of the overarching SFP framework. If a researcher attempts 
to test the explanatory value of the SFP framework by assessing the extent to which a 
context-specific framework, based on the SFP framework, explains the performance 
of a particular policy, he/she will find it very difficult to locate the origin of any flaws 
in the explanatory capacity of his/her framework – whether they lie in the SFP frame-Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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work  itself  or  in  the  way  in  which  the  researcher  has  adapted  it  to  the  specific 
context.  This  makes  it  impossible  to  falsify  the  original  framework  –  a  lack  of 
explanatory capacity can always be blamed on weak adaptation to the specific 
context under examination. Given that Keukeleire provides little guidance as to how 
exactly the SFP framework should be adapted to make it appropriate to the context 
to which it is being applied, the way in which any researcher chooses to modify the 
framework will inevitably depend to a large extent on the (evidence-based) choices 
that  he/she  makes  about  the  sorts  of  sectors  and  levels  that  are  relevant  to  a 
particular policy. This makes weak adaptation likely. Thus, although the adaptability 
of  the  framework  may  reflect  the  difficulty  of  reducing  policy-making  to  a  set  of 
universal  rules,  and  thus  serve  as  a  strength  for  a  policy-maker,  it  hampers  its 
parsimony,  generalisability,  and  testability,  and  therefore  its  value,  both  as  a 
paradigm for policy-makers and as an explanatory theory for academics.  
A second limitation to the explanatory value of the SFP framework arises from the 
fact that, although it highlights the various levels and sectors that might be relevant 
to a SFP, it does not seek to explain the processes by which structural change occurs 
within these settings. Certain suggestions of factors influencing the sustainability of 
structural change are put forward in the Introduction’s discussion of sustainability and 
internalisation;4 however, the exact mechanisms by which this change occurs would 
require  the  use  of  further  explanatory  theory.  This  use  of  additional  theory  is  not 
problematic  in  itself  and  is  welcomed  by  Keukeleire,5  but  it  further  reduces  the 
parsimony of the approach and predicates its explanatory value on a further set of 
choices to be made by the researcher or policy-maker.6 A student seeking to explain 
the performance of a policy using the SFP framework might, for example, find that 
this policy addresses the sectors and levels that he/she has deemed relevant but 
that it has not performed well. Whether the SFP framework succeeds in explaining this 
poor performance or not will depend on the supplementary explanatory theory that 
is attached to it. The SFP framework itself does not offer much guidance on how a 
policy should address the levels and sectors that it identifies. 
Finally, one possible remedy to issues related to parsimony and explanatory capacity 
discussed  here  might  be  the  development  of  a  typology  of  context-specific  SFP 
                                                           
4 See Introduction, p. 5.  
5 Keukeleire, op.cit., p. 20. 
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frameworks. This typology could also include different theories to aid the explanation 
of the mechanisms of structural change in different case types. It would increase the 
usefulness of the SFP framework to policy-makers and would accelerate the process 
of analysis for researchers, who might be able to avoid developing their model from 
scratch.  However,  the  development  of  a  typology  would  not  escape  the  issues 
relating to testability and generalisability discussed above – potential would remain 
for errors in terms of the choice of model and the uniqueness of each policy context 
would still necessitate some degree of adaptation. 
 
The Specifics of the SFP Framework 
Beyond the general issues relating to the suitability of the SFP framework for serving 
as  a  theoretical  model  or  as  a  paradigm  for  policy-makers,  a m ore  detailed 
examination of the way in which the SFP framework is intended to be applied raises 
certain more specific issues.  
 
Sectors and Levels 
Firstly, the divisions between sectors and levels set out in the Introduction might be 
questioned on the grounds that they artificially separate areas of activity that are in 
reality  interwoven.  It  is  important,  therefore,  to  underline  the  function  of  these 
divisions – they are not intended to reflect exactly the reality of life, and structures, on 
the  ground,  but  rather  to  provide  a  framework  with  which  to  approach  policy-
making. It is less important to delineate the clear boundaries between each sector 
and level than it is to ensure that no relevant areas, and no links between them, are 
missed.7 The divisions are not, in themselves, hugely important. More important is that 
the comprehensive coverage encouraged by the different sectors and levels of the 
SFP framework can direct our attention to often neglected areas, including  ‘low-
political’ and social processes not usually considered as central to foreign policy.8 
Although this shift of emphasis has a p ositive effect on many areas of analysis, it 
should be highlighted that a movement away from ‘high-political’ analysis can be 
detrimental to the explanation of certain foreign policy developments. This suggests 
that the SFP framework might be able to explain the performance of some types of 
foreign  policies  better  than  others.  By  testing  the  framework  against  a  range  of 
different foreign policies, students may be able to establish the sorts of policies that it 
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can  explain  well  and  those  that  it  struggles  to  grapple  with.  While  it  might  be 
expected  that  the  framework  will  deal  better  with  long-term,  low-political  foreign 
policies, my experience with the SFP framework suggests that even in this type of 
policy, high-level political decisions can often be taken in a way that an SFP matrix 
struggles to explain. This may make it necessary to supplement the framework with 
more actor-focused approaches to give it comprehensive explanatory value. 
 
The Phases of the Policy Process 
The division of the policy process into four separate phases may also be problematic. 
For example, in the iterative reality of the EU foreign policy-making, it is often difficult 
to  distinguish  separate  ‘objectives’  and  ‘output’  phases:  objectives  can  be  set, 
adjusted, and re-set several times, while instruments and resources also change over 
time. Such adjustments conform with Brighi and Hill’s conception of foreign policy 
activity  as  being  shaped  by  interaction  between  foreign  policy  actors  and  their 
context.9 This conception calls into the question the possibility of treating a SFP as a 
linear process. Thus, while Keukeleire’s four phases are valuable in that they draw our 
attention to neglected parts of the policy process and allow us to locate the point at 
which  issues  with  a  particular  policy  emerge  and  to  demonstrate  that  a  foreign 
policy  might  be  ‘structural’  at  one  stage  but  not  at  another,  it  may  be  that  the 
divisions that they suggest are too far from the reality of the policy-making process to 
make them valuable. The case studies in this collection shed light on the practical 
usefulness of Keukeleire’s policy-phase divisions.10 
 
Assessing Internalisation and Sustainability 
Two final elements of the SFP framework that may be problematic are the concepts 
of internalisation and sustainability. Internalisation is difficult to quantify, particularly 
when protracted fieldwork is impossible. Sustainability can only be assessed over the 
long  term,  meaning  that  nothing  more  than  tentative  conclusions  about  the 
sustainability  of  contemporary  SFPs,  such  as  those  examined  in  this  paper,  are 
possible. Despite this, the framework’s emphasis on sustainability focuses attention on 
long-term processes that could be ignored in conventional work on foreign policy.11 
                                                           
9 E. Brighi & C. Hill, “Implementation and Behaviour”, in S. Smith et al. (eds.), Foreign Policy: 
Theories, Actors, Cases, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 118-120. 
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Conclusions 
This essay has briefly set out some of the key issues that any researcher, student or 
practitioner seeking to make use of the SFP framework has to confront. The principal 
limitations  of  the  SFP  framework  appear  to  reside  in  its  reliance  on  individual 
contextual analyses, and its failure to provide explanations (without supplementary 
theory) of processes, including, but not limited to, those relating to high-level political 
decisions. Until there is a reliable typology of SFP frameworks – to which this paper will 
hopefully  contribute  –  these  issues  will  continue  to  hinder  SFP’s  parsimony  and 
comprehensiveness.  The  SFP  framework  also  suffers  from  a m ore  fundamental 
problem – it is, at present, suited only to a purely analytical application, providing 
answers  to  the  question  ‘Is  this  policy  structural?’.  As  discussed  above,  the 
significance of these answers can legitimately be questioned. Its future capacity to 
be applied normatively, either as a theory used to explain policy performance or as 
a  paradigm  for  policy-makers,  will  depend  on  students’  and  researchers’ 
assessments of its explanatory capacity. 
Despite these limitations, this essay suggests several strengths of the SFP framework 
that have been illustrated in this collection’s case studies. First amongst these is its 
capacity to highlight often-neglected, but highly relevant, areas of foreign policy 
and  the  context  in  which  it  is  implemented,  including  long-term,  low-political 
processes.  By  demonstrating  the  importance  and  complexity  of  context,  the  SFP 
framework serves to underline the difficulty of bringing about sustainable change 
through  foreign  policy,  often  leading  to  the  conclusion  that  SFP  requires  huge 
resources and a significant level of penetration into its target country. The examples 
Keukeleire gives of successful SFP – the Marshall Plan and EU enlargement – reinforce 
this point. The SFP framework can thus indicate the sorts of instruments and activities 
that are necessary for successful SFP and, where these are impossible to implement, 
to  alert  policy-makers and researchers to deficiencies in a policy and adjust their 
expectations accordingly. By locating the points in the policy process at which such 
deficiencies  first  emerge,  the  SFP  framework  can  also  give  more  precision  to 
researchers’  and  policy-makers’  foreign  policy  analyses,  helping  them  to  identify 
possible mitigating actions. 
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7.  Concluding Remarks 
Stephan Keukeleire 
 
This  collection  of  essays  analyses  the  EU’s  rule  of  law  promotion  in  the  European 
neighbourhood through the conceptual lens of the ‘structural foreign policy’ (SFP) 
framework  (see also the Introduction of this paper). Each author critically reflects 
upon the SFP framework, points to its potential and limitations, builds upon it, refutes 
some aspects, or complements it with other analytical frameworks. The application 
of the SFP framework on four relatively different cases also allows us to gain more 
insight  in  both  the  practical  applicability  of  the  SFP  framework  and  in  the 
complexities  of  rule  of  law  promotion.  These  concluding  remarks  aim  to  provide 
some reflections on the SFP concept and on the related challenges for EU foreign 
policy research. 
The  SFP  framework  was  designed  to  provide  an  analytical  tool  to  examine  a 
dimension of foreign policy that is often neglected in the analysis of foreign policy: 
influencing and shaping structures as a major objective of foreign policy. The focus 
on  the  EU’s  rule  of  law  promotion  in  this  publication  is  only  one  example  of  SFP 
analysis;  the same methodology can also be applied to EU foreign policy (or to the 
foreign policy of other actors) that aims to realise structural changes in other fields, 
such as democracy, human rights, etc.  
The  comprehensive  nature  of  the  SFP  framework  –  the  attention  to  structures  on 
various  levels  and  in  various  sectors,  taking  into  account  both  material  and 
immaterial factors – aims to force the analyst to look beyond those structures which 
the EU  (and EU foreign policy analysts) considers important. Thus, it also forces to 
include structures which may be of crucial importance in the context of and from 
the perspective of a third country or region. This leads to a first major challenge: the 
need to have a sound knowledge of not only the EU’s foreign policy, instruments and 
actions towards a third country and region, but to also have a sound knowledge of 
the  third  country  or  region  that  is  the  ‘target’,  ‘recipient’  or  ‘subject’  of  the  EU’s 
policy. This is well highlighted in the contribution by Tressia Hobeika on EU micro-rule-
of-law policies in Lebanon. One of the subtitles in this essay succinctly formulates the 
related  challenge:  “Know  thy  structures”.  Understanding  the  EU’s  rule  of  law 
promotion in Lebanon requires from the analyst a profound understanding of the 
existing  structures:  not  only  on  the  level  of  the  state  (the  level  which  gains  most Metais, Thépaut & Keukeleire (eds.) 
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attention in both the conduct and academic analysis of EU foreign policy), but also 
on the societal level and on what Tressia Hobeika labels as the micro-level. A sound 
knowledge of the Lebanese society is essential to see and understand the existence 
and impact of the existing politico-sectarian and socio-sectarian structures that are 
often hidden from outside observers. This knowledge is required to understand that 
the EU’s rule of law promotion initiatives may, in fact, not serve to strengthen the rule 
of  law  in  the  way  the  EU  has  in  mind,  but  may  unintentionally  rather  strengthen 
hidden patron-client rule of law structures that are part of the sectarian organisation 
of Lebanese society.  
The need for expertise on the society, country or region that is targeted by EU foreign 
policy explains why the analysis of the latter is very well served by linking it to area 
studies  (Middle-Eastern  studies,  Balkan  studies,  South-Eastern  Asia  studies,  China 
studies, etc.); by involving scholars from the countries concerned; by using not only 
Western  sources  of  information  but  also  sources  written  in  local,  non-Western 
languages; and by including non-Western conceptualisations. In short, it requires the 
adoption  of  what  can  be  labelled  an  ‘outside-in  approach’.1  More  generally,  it 
implies  that  the analyst  also  needs  an  open  mind  to see, recognise  and accept 
‘difference’ instead of generalising developments and features specific to European 
processes and European assumptions about space, time and sovereignty to the rest 
of the world.2 
A second challenge is related to the explanatory power of the SFP framework itself. 
As  explained  in  various  publications,3  this  analytical  framework  points  to  factors 
which  help  explaining  the  success  or  failure  of  a f oreign  policy  in  shaping  or 
influencing structures and pursuing structural changes. These include, for instance, 
the  need  to  take  into  account  the  relevant  structures  on  the  various  interrelated 
levels and in the various interrelated sectors (and thus not only to focus on what is 
considered important in the EU). It also points to the importance of immaterial factors 
(such as legitimacy and internalisation) in addition to material factors.  
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However, the comprehensive nature of the SFP framework, as well as the required 
sensitivity  to  the  context,  make  it  hard  to  identify  clear  causal  relations  and, 
particularly, to increase the explanatory power of this analytical framework. This is 
also  underlined  in  the  essay  by  Clement  Naylor,  who  also  points  to  another 
drawback of the sensitivity to context: the problem to generalise the specific findings 
of an analysis. This brings us to one of the dilemmas in the analysis of (EU) foreign 
policy: the SFP framework has been designed to provide a tool to overcome the 
pitfalls  of  simplification  and  reductionism  (the  focus  on  only  a  limited  number  of 
recurrent factors) in the analysis of EU foreign policy; but the downside is indeed that 
this  leads  to  a  too  great  complexity  and  thus  a  lack  of  parsimony  which  allows 
scholars to generalise and provide clear explanations.  
The wish to increase the explanatory power of the analysis is also one of the reasons 
why several authors in the preceding essays connect the SFP framework to other 
analytical  frameworks.  Examples  of  these  connections  are:  the  linkages  with  the 
literature on ‘external governance’ and ‘socialisation’ (in the contributions of Adnan 
Ćerimagić and Arianna Catalano); and with the ‘layers of impact’ model of Morlino 
and Magen (in the essay of Daan Fonck).  
Another solution to further strengthen the analytical and explanatory power of the 
SFP  concept  is  to  develop  carefully-designed  research  projects,  which  explicitly 
focus on a limited number of sections or boxes of the matrix presented in Figure 1 of 
the Introduction. When studying the EU’s rule of law promotion in a specific country 
(or another dimension of a foreign policy that aims to promote structural changes), 
an analyst can concentrate on the relationship between only two or three boxes of 
the matrix, thereby examining, for each box, what the organising principles are; how 
these organising principles are institutionalised and operationalised; what the inter-
relationship  between  these  boxes  is;  the  extent  to  which  and  through  which 
approaches  and  instruments  the  EU’s  policy  touches  upon  these  sections  of  the 
matrix;  and  what  the  potential  impact  of  the  EU’s  policy  can  be.  Hypotheses  or 
research questions can be formulated with regard to each section of the matrix, to 
the interrelationship between these sections and to the role of the EU therein.4  A 
scholar who wants to examine the extent to which the EU succeeds in creating or 
strengthening national judicial structures (the box ‘legal sector / state level’) can link 
this to, for example, the various boxes in the economic sector:  
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•  ‘economic sector / individual level’ (the sustained availability of decent salaries for 
judges – or alternatively the need felt by judges to systematically resort to ‘informal 
practices’ to guarantee a sufficient income); 
•  ‘economic  sector  /  state  level’  (the  sustained  availability  of  a  budget  for  the 
Ministry  of  Justice  required  to  pay  decent  salaries  and  of  a  sound  chain  of 
payment system to guarantee that the salaries are transferred to the judges); 
•  ‘economic  sector  /  global  level’  (what  are  the  macro-economic  and  financial 
rules of the game imposed by the IMF or the World Bank on that country and to 
what extent do these impact upon the national budget – and thus also the salaries 
on the individual level?).  
Moving away from the economic sector, other boxes that can be subject to analysis 
may include: 
•  ‘security  sector  /  individual  level’  (to  what  extent  is  the  personal  security 
guaranteed of judges who want to abide by and command respect for the rule 
of law?);  
•  ‘legal sector / societal level’ (to what extent is ‘rule of law’ seen as a legitimate 
principle in a society and are courts and judges considered trustworthy?). 
This  last  example  is  also  related  to  the  third  dimension  of  Figure  1,  ‘internalisation’, 
which is an essential dimension in view of the sustainability of structures and structural 
changes.5   
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